Testimonial Consistency: The Hobgoblin of the Federal False Declaration Statute by DeLong, Sidney
Denver Law Review 
Volume 66 Issue 2 Article 2 
February 2021 
Testimonial Consistency: The Hobgoblin of the Federal False 
Declaration Statute 
Sidney DeLong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Sidney DeLong, Testimonial Consistency: The Hobgoblin of the Federal False Declaration Statute, 66 
Denv. U. L. Rev. 135 (1989). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
TESTIMONIAL CONSISTENCY: THE HOBGOBLIN OF
THE FEDERAL FALSE DECLARATION STATUTE
SIDNEY DELONG*
INTRODUCTION
When a witness testifies inconsistently with his former testimony,
any one of several things might be happening. The witness might be
expressing a change in his memory or understanding of the events about
which he is testifying, the witness might be correcting an intentional
falsehood in the former testimony, or the witness might be lying. Be-
cause inconsistent testimony per se is neither harmful nor beneficial to
the judicial process, the law has no apparent reason to deter a witness
from testifying inconsistently with his former testimony. Yet, inconsis-
tent testimony is penalized under federal perjury law. This article ques-
tions the wisdom of such a rule.
A perjury statute cannot be judged in isolation from the judicial sys-
tem in which it functions. In the American adversary trial process, evi-
dence is taken through factual narratives that unfold during trial
examination. Attorneys from one side, then from the other, ask wit-
nesses questions designed to elicit favorable testimony. A witness's
story is not told all at once but in bits and pieces over time. Under
cross-examination the witness is asked to test his first account against his
memory, common knowledge, or the examiner's suggestions. As a re-
sult of cross-examination, a witness's recollection or understanding of
events may change, even as he testifies. An ability to explain, revise, or
even to disavow former testimony is implicit in the adversary examina-
tion as presently structured.
As presently formulated and construed, the federal perjury laws un-
realistically ignore the needs of the adversary trial process by mandating
a sort of "foolish consistency" in trial and grand jury testimony. Wit-
nesses who change their testimony for any reason are jeopardized by a
statute that deems inconsistent testimony to be prima facie evidence of
perjury. Simultaneously, the law appears to invite witnesses to correct
testimonial errors, promising immunity from prosecution if they do. In
reality, the promise is empty. The provisions are not merely theoreti-
cally incoherent, they are counterproductive as well. To inhibit incon-
sistent testimony is to inhibit truth as well as falsehood. A rule
mandating consistency in testimony costs more than it is worth as a de-
terrent to perjury.
This article focuses on the inconsistent statement provision of the
Federal False Declaration Statute. Part I of this article identifies certain
* Visiting Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law, A.B. Vanderbilt
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anomalous aspects of perjury that make it particularly difficult to control
by threats of punishment. Perjury's resemblance to innocent mistake
creates a risk that criminal sanctions will be misapplied. These sanctions
may have counterproductive effects, at times inducing people to commit
perjury and at others inhibiting people from correcting inaccurate testi-
mony that they have previously given. Part II demonstrates the way in
which the conflict between the goals of deterrence and mitigation is
manifested in the federal perjury laws, which seek both to penalize "in-
consistent" testimony and to encourage "recantation" of incorrect testi-
mony. Statutory restrictions and judicial construction have resolved this
conflict against mitigation. Part III describes the harmful effects of this
statutory policy on witnesses and the attorneys who represent them. It
also questions the strategic value of the inconsistent statement provision
to federal prosecutors. Part IV offers a recommendation for a more co-
herent statutory policy toward inconsistent testimony and evaluates that
recommendation in light of the regulatory problems identified in Part I.
It concludes that federal law should more liberally encourage correc-
tions of prior testimony even at the cost of some additional loss in
deterrence.
I. A BRIEr EXAMINATION OF SOME PROBLEMS IN REGULATING PERJURY
The crime of perjury tends to resist analysis under the traditional
criminal law model of deterrence. Deterrence theory assumes that peo-
ple will refrain from criminal activity if they know that criminal acts will
be met with swift and certain punishment. In its modem, economic in-
carnation, deterrence theory sees the potential criminal as a rational
economic actor capable of calculating the costs and benefits of different
courses of conduct. ' Such a theory posits that if such an actor concludes
1. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205-06 (3rd ed. 1986); Posner, An
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLO. L. REV. 1193 (1985). This analysis also as-
sumes that the criminal is risk neutral, accurately informed about the relevant factors, and
can do his math correctly.
Perjury laws find their economic justification in the costs that false testimony imposes
on the litigation system. Perjured testimony, if it succeeds in its objective, misleads the
trier of fact into inaccurate judgments, which in turn result in injustice and in social costs.
See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw at 514. The possibility of perjury also in-
creases the transaction costs associated with litigation. In the absence of any sanction
against perjury, litigants and triers of fact would be driven to seek more complete, and
thus more costly, corroboration of witnesses' testimony.
To act as a deterrent, perjury laws must impose risks that offset the benefits that wit-
nesses may anticipate from the commission of perjury. The potential perjurer who thinks
like a risk-neutral economist or gambler will forego perjury when his estimate of the cost
of the penalty multiplied by what he perceives to be the likelihood of its imposition (the
"cost product") exceeds his estimate of the product of the value to him of what perjury
would bring about, multiplied by the perceived likelihood that the perjury will bring the
benefit about (the "benefit product"). Increasing the cost product by increasing the sanc-
tions or by increasing the likelihood of their imposition should decrease the amount of
perjury committed. When the benefit product is large, as it may be for witnesses who are
criminal defendants facing capital charges, it is unlikely that increasing the cost product
will decrease perjury.
The potential perjurer's actual calculation of potential costs and benefits can be a bit
more complex than this description suggests because of a form of reciprocal relationship
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that the costs to him of conviction multiplied by the likelihood of convic-
tion exceed the product of the crime's benefits to him multiplied by the
likelihood that he will realize such benefits, he will refrain from commit-
ting the crime. Lawmakers can alter the costs of conviction by changing
the penalties for conviction. They can alter the probability of conviction
by changing the elements of the offense. Applied to perjury, then, the
assumptions of deterrence theory imply that increasing the cost or
probability of conviction of perjury will lead to a reduction in the occur-
rence of the offense, making trial testimony more truthful and judg-
ments more reliable.
Several phenomena make application of the deterrence model to
perjury problematic. Evidence tending to prove the actus reus of perjury
is often ambiguous, making perjury difficult to distinguish from inno-
cent behavior. Depending on its response to this problem, the law of
perjury risks over or under-deterrence. The cost/benefit analysis of the
deterrence model is also complicated by the tendency of perjury laws
that penalize inconsistent testimony to dissuade witnesses from mitigat-
ing the effects of prior perjury or innocently incorrect testimony. The
following subsections discuss these phenomena.
A. The Problem of Detection
Perjury at common law is the willful making of a false oath about a
material fact in a judicial proceeding.2 Although the crime of perjury
occurs under the very nose of the judicial system, its detection and pun-
ishment have always presented serious difficulties. The theory of deter-
rence requires that the trier of fact be able to identify the proscribed
between the cost product and the value component of the benefit product. The value of
the perjury to the witness will depend in part upon the likelihood that the jury will believe
him. Anything that makes the perjury more believable will increase its value and increase
the incentive to lie, up to a limit represented by the potential gain represented by a
favorable judgment or the loss represented by an unfavorable one. The believability of
the perjury will depend in part on the jury's estimate of the witness's perception of the risk
of punishment if he is caught lying. Thus prosecutors argue in capital cases that a defend-
ant who testifies has nothing to lose by perjury: the cost product will exceed any benefit
product. This calculation leads to an anomaly: the greater the likelihood of punishment,
the more likely the jury is to believe the witness, and the greater the incentive he has to lie.
That is, the increased risk of punishment makes it more likely that the jury will believe the
lie, increasing the value of the lie. The risk would, for the same reason, also tend to de-
crease the likelihood of a perjury conviction, reducing the risk component of the cost
product.
But there are wheels within wheels. A rational jury would take this increased incentive
into consideration and would both discount the cost product and increase its estimate of
the benefit product. The jury's reaction would reduce the witness's incentive to commit
perjury. A rational witness, however, would know that the jury would discount the credi-
bility of his testimony in this way. This knowledge, which of course a rational jury will
foresee, once again makes his testimony more credible. But if the jury takes this into ac-
count, etc. This endlessly oscillating, reciprocal relationship suggests that even if all the
actors are rational, the effect of an increased risk of punishment will depend on indetermi-
nate interactions among the actors. See Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1263, 1280-84 (1985).
2. See infra note 16. Additional elements not pertinent to the discussion here are that
the matter be material and that the statement be given in a judicial proceeding.
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behavior reliably in order to avoid over or under-deterrence.3 Optimal
enforcement of perjury laws requires an accurate way of identifying per-
jurious statements and distinguishing them from innocent testimonial
inaccuracies. Unfortunately, the chief objective manifestation of the
crime of perjury, the falsity of a witness's sworn statement, is a common
characteristic of innocent behavior or even behavior that the justice sys-
tem should encourage.
4
The giving of false evidence can be wholly innocent. False evidence
can result from truthful testimony about inaccurate observation, mem-
ory lapse, misunderstanding, or miscommunication. A witness who mis-
perceived an event may truthfully testify to his misperception. A
forgetful witness may truthfully describe his inaccurate recollection of
an event. A witness who misunderstands a question may truthfully an-
swer the question that he thought he heard. In some of these instances,
the witness might even be said to have "known" the truth at the time he
testified falsely. Yet in none of them has the witness willfully made a
false oath. Mere falsity of the witness's statement furnishes an inade-
quate inference of perjury.
An arguably more obvious manifestation that a witness intentionally
lied is that he made inconsistent sworn statements. Here, it would seem,
the inference of intentional lying is stronger than that resulting from
mere falsity because in making one of the statements, the witness seems
to acknowledge that he knows the other to be false. Yet, inconsistent
statements alone are insufficient to support an inference of perjury. A
witness will testify inconsistently whenever he corrects any of the inno-
cent testimonial errors noted in the preceding paragraph.
The difficulty of identifying perjury creates a risk that perjury laws
will result in overdeterrence if they identify and penalize ambiguous be-
havior or inconsistent statements, as a substitute for the behavior sought
to be regulated, intentional lying. As will be seen, federal perjury law
has adopted this strategy.
B. The Problem of Counterproductivity
Haldeman: [Speaking hypothetically] But Magruder then says
. . ."Now, I go down to the Grand Jury, because obviously they
are going to call me back, and I go to defend myself against
McCord's statement which I know is true... You're saying to
me, 'Don't make up a new lie to cover the old lie.' What would
you recommend that I do? Stay with the old lie and hope I
would come out, or clean myself up and go to jail?
' 5
3. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 514. Over-deterrence refers to the inhibition of
nontargeted behavior by the threat of punishment; under-deterrence refers to the failure
of the threat of punishment to deter all of the targeted behavior.
4. In a sense, the very nature of the trial process implies that false testimony must be
and remain commonplace. The raison detre of a trial is to resolve conflicting accounts of
events by announcing a form of public truth, a finding of fact. Such a finding necessarily
implies that some of the conflicting evidentiary accounts are "false." In this sense, trials
are replete with evidence that is later regarded as having been false, but not perjurious.
5. THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRitrs 246 (G. Gold ed. 1974).
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Laws that punish lying often have unpredictable effects. Threats to
punish lying sometimes induce people to lie precisely in order to avoid
the punishment for lying, as in the quoted example. 6 This paradoxical
risk is most pronounced whenever the witness is asked to acknowledge
that prior testimony was inaccurate, e.g. during cross-examination. If
inconsistent testimony increases the likelihood of punishment, the wit-
ness who realizes that her original testimony was inaccurate will have an
incentive to lie on cross-examination whether or not the original re-
sponse was perjurious. Unlike most other criminal laws, perjury statutes
can create a perverse incentive to commit the very act they forbid. As a
corollary, they are also unusually7 counterproductive in deterring wit-
nesses from engaging in the forms of inconsistent testimony that the
judicial system wishes to encourage. Inconsistent testimony is often a
sign of bonafides rather than duplicity. Testimonial revisions are the nat-
ural concomitant of candor and are often essential to the development
of evidence at trial.
This potential for counterproductivity precludes a simple reliance
on the assumption that maximizing the penal costs imposed on perjury
will necessarily inhibit it: such "disincentives" might actually be incen-
tives. Increasing their severity might well increase the incidence of the
harm they are intended to prevent. 8 Any perjury prevented by an in-
crease in punishment must be additionally discounted by the value of
the useful testimonial corrections that such punishment inhibits.
6. In economic terms, a lie may reduce the witness's chances of being apprehended
and convicted of committing prior perjury. It also may reduce the witness's exposure to
conviction for perjury when the witness has innocently testified inaccurately. The witness
who contemplates changing previously inaccurate testimony must perform a rather com-
plicated calculation of the probability-weighted costs he will face under each course of
action, i.e. affirmance of the previous testimony or retraction of the testimony. Affirmance
may decrease the chance of detection yet increase the likelihood of conviction if the lie is
detected because it reduces the defendant's ability to argue that the lie was inadvertent.
Retraction will have effects that vary with the legal effect of retraction, as discussed below.
7. Normally, criminal sanctions do not threaten to deter desirable behavior. Laws
against murder, theft, or drug dealing, for example, rarely jeopardize or inhibit activities
generally thought to be socially useful because the activities involved in those crimes rarely
resemble socially useful behavior. When the behavior to be regulated itself is sometimes
socially useful, regulations can, in theory, be tailored so as to permit the behavior at the
optimum level. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968); A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 73-84 (1983);
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984) (characterizing sanctions as
involving abrupt jumps in the cost of illegal activity and prices as more elastic). Even if we
assume that perjury is never socially useful however, it does not follow that laws against
perjury do not jeopardize socially useful activity.
8. The problems of detecting perjury make this possibility doubly perplexing be-
cause the effects of perjury statutes cannot be measured. Unlike some other crimes, occur-
rences of perjury cannot be quantified. Without data on the relative effects of the
counterproductive potential, we cannot tell whether the benefits of an increased likelihood
of conviction will exceed the costs. The lack of any data on the ratio of punishment to
occurrence makes it impossible for either the perjurer or the legislator to engage in classic
risk/benefit analysis that is central to the instrumentalist calculus. "Proof" of the relative
effectiveness of various forms of the perjury statute must therefore proceed by argument
based on speculation and anecdote. In this respect, we have not advanced much since
Holmes' plaintive question: "What have we better than a blind guess to show that the
criminal law in its present form does more good than harm?" O.W. HOLMES, The Path of
the Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 180 (1920).
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C. The Problem of Deterrence versus Mitigation
Conflict between the goals of deterrence and mitigation is inevita-
ble in any criminal statute. The more effective a criminal statute is in
deterring conduct through the threat of swift and certain punishment,
the more such a statute inhibits people who have engaged in the con-
duct from admitting it so as to minimize the damage caused by the con-
duct. With some crimes, this loss of mitigation is negligible in relation
to the value of deterring the conduct. Thus, it is presumably more im-
portant to deter murder than it is to encourage confessions of murder
because a confession does little to remedy the harm caused by the act. 9
One cost of severe sanctions against murder may well be to increase the
costs of investigation of such crimes but this cost is thought to be out-
weighed by the value of the deterrence purchased by those sanctions.
Perjury does not yield to such simplistic analysis. Although the
crime of perjury is complete when the witness makes the the false state-
ment, perjury usually does not cause serious harm until a tribunal acts in
reliance on the false statement. Such harm can be largely obviated if the
perjury is corrected before the tribunal acts. Thus, in most cases there is
a window of time after the perjury is committed and before the tribunal
acts during which the harm can be mitigated. The judicial system has a
strong institutional interest in encouraging witnesses to correct perjuri-
ous statements before tribunals act in reliance on them. In addition, as
noted in the preceding subsection, the judicial system also has an even
greater interest in encouraging the correction or mitigation of inno-
cently inaccurate testimony.
Yet, to give witnesses an opportunity to correct perjury and thereby
avoid punishment weakens the deterrent effect of sanctions against per-
jury and could increase the incidence of the crime and its associated
costs. Witnesses might be more inclined to make the initial decision to
commit perjury under a rule that permitted them to correct the perjury
without risk of punishment.' 0
Because maximum punishment for intentional lying will always in-
terfere with maximum incentives to correct lies, as well as innocent er-
rors, any perjury rule must mediate the conflict between the institutional
goals of deterrence and mitigation. The conflict is clearly apparent in
the federal perjury statutes.
II. THE FEDERAL PERJURY STATUTES
Two federal statutes prohibit the giving of intentionally false testi-
mony in federal trial and grand jury proceedings: the General Perjury
9. Where social gain can be seen from the defendant's mitigation of the effects of his
criminal behavior, the law does encourage such mitigation, as in the defense of withdrawal
in the law of attempt. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) and accompanying Comment (de-
fense offers defendants a motive to desist from criminal designs); Rotenberg, Withdrawal as
a Defense to Relational Crimes, 1962 Wisc. L. REV. 596.
10. This possibility is discussed below, Part IV.
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Statute" and the False Declaration Statute.12 Considered together,
these statutes create a bewildering schedule of risks and rewards for the
witness who contemplates changing his testimony.
Because of the difficulty in distinguishing perjured testimony from
innocent mistakes, courts have historically applied the severe sanctions
of the law of perjury with caution, so as not to punish innocent behavior
or unduly frighten prospective witnesses. 13 This reluctance has, until
recently, been manifested in evidentiary rules that make perjury excep-
tionally difficult to prove.' 4 The federal perjury laws illustrate both the
old reluctance and a newer approach, designed to facilitate conviction.
A. The General Perjury Statute and the Common Law Evidence Rules
The General Perjury Statute, which derived from the common
law,' 5 defines perjury as "willfully and contrary to . . . oath [stating or
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982). See infra note 16.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982). See infra note 26.
13. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973) ("The seminal modern treat-
ment of the history of the offense concludes that one consideration of policy overshad-
owed all others during the years when perjury first emerged as a common law offense:
'That the measures taken against the offense must not be so severe as to discourage wit-
nesses from appearing or testifying.' Study of Peigury, reprinted in REPORT OF NEW YORK LAW
REVISION COMMISSION, LEGIS. Doc. No. 60, 249 (1935)); Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S.
606, 608-10 (1945). See alo United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) (The rule
that perjury convictions not be based on excessively vague or fundamentally ambiguous
questions prevents witnesses "from unfairly bearing the risks associated with the inade-
quacies of their examiners, and . . . encurage[s] participation in the judicial system."); 7
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2041 (Chardbourne Rev. 1978) (herein-
after EVIDENCE) (citing W.M. BEST, EVIDENCE 605-06 (1849)):
Measured merely by its religious or moral enormity, perjury, always a grievous,
would in many cases be the greatest of crimes, and as such be deserving of the
severest punishment which the law could inflict. But when we consider the very
peculiar nature of this offence, and that every person who appears as a witness in
a court ofjustice is liable to be accused of it by those against whom his evidence
tells, who are frequently the basest and most unprincipled of mankind; and when
we remember how powerless are the best rules of municipal law without the co-
operation of society to enforce them, - we shall see that the obligation of pro-
tecting witnesses from oppression, or annoyance by charges or threats of charges
of having borne false testimony, is far paramount to that of giving even perjury its
deserts. To repress that crime, prevention is better than cure; and the law of
England relies, for this purpose, on the means provided for detecting and expos-
ing the crime at the moment of commission, - such as publicity, cross-examina-
tion, the aid of a jury, etc.; and on the infliction of a severe, though not excessive
punishment, whenever the commission of the crime has been clearly proved.
14. See discussion at Part I-A, below. Perhaps as a result of these rules, the number of
prosecutions for perjury in the federal courts has been miniscule in relation to the amount
of intentional false testimony that common experience tells us must take place. For exam-
ple, in the ten year period from 1956 to 1965, out of 307,227 federal criminal defendants
charged, only 713 were charged with perjury. The conviction rate for perjury was 52.7%
in comparison to 78.7% for all other crimes. 115 CONG. REc. 5880 (1969) (remarks of
Sen. McClellan). These data antedated the passage of the False Declaration Statute.
15. At common law, perjury consists of willfully making a false oath with regard to a
material matter while under oath in a judicial proceeding. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
§ 601 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1978); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 511 (3d ed. 1982);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment I ("In general, [perjury] consists of four elements:
(i) the making or reaffirming of a false statement; (ii) that is material to an official proceed-
ing; (iii) in violation of an oath or equivalent affirmation; (iv) when the party making the
statement does not believe it to be true."). An answer that is literally true is not perjury,
even if it is not responsive and arguably misleading by negative implication.
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subscribing] any material matter that [the witness] does not believe to be
true." 16
Prosecutions under the General Perjury Statute must satisfy strict
common law proof requirements. The government must prove that the
witness willfully made a statement without a belief that the statement
was true. 17 This lack of belief must usually be inferred from the untruth
of the statement.' 8 Federal courts have added as an element that the
government prove that statement was actually untrue. 19
To prove that the statement was untrue, the government must sat-
isfy the two-witness rule, which provides that the falsity of the oath can-
not be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of only one witness.
20
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1621. The text of the statute is as follows:
Whoever-
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and con-
trary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of per-
jury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully
subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true;
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be
fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This
section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or
without the United States.
17. Untrue testimony is not perjurious unless the witness does not believe it to be
true. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982). Thus, untrue testimony is not perjury if it results from a
slip of the tongue, a misunderstanding of the question, misperception, or a faulty memory.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 3. Some courts held that a sworn untruth made
recklessly, or without knowledge of whether it was true, was not perjury, although most
held that it was. Compare id. (recklessness is sufficient for guilt) with WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW §§ 602-03. See also United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952); WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 604; and R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 516-17. The general federal rule is that true testimony given under a mis-
taken belief that it is false is not perjury. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 2(d).
18. American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 411 (1950); United
States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971) ("In the
absence of an admission by the defendant, the only way a defendant's knowledge of the
falsity of his statement can be proved is through circumstantial evidence."); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 241.1 Comment 2(d) ("In the usual perjury prosecution, corroboration of an in-
tent to lie is provided by the falsity of the statement made.").
19. United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 924
(1980); United States v. Magin, 280 F.2d 74, 76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 914 (1960).
The rational of such a requirement is that, in the absence of the corroboration of the
defendant's intent established by the falsity of the statement, a significant danger exists
that a conviction would be based upon jury speculation.
20. Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 626 (1926). In Weiler v. United States,
323 U.S. 606 (1945), the Court justified retention of the two witness rule as follows:
The special rule which bars conviction for perjury solely upon the evidence of
single witness is deeply rooted in past centuries. That it renders successful per-
jury prosecution more difficult than it otherwise would be is obvious, and most
criticism of the rule has stemmed from this result. It is argued that since effective
administration ofjustice is largely dependent upon truthful testimony, society is
ill-served by an "anachronistic" rule which tends to burden and discourage pros-
ecutions for perjury. Proponents of the rule on the other hand, contend that
society is well-served by such consequence. Lawsuits frequently engender in de-
feated litigants sharp resentment and hostilities against adverse witnesses, and it
is argued, not without persuasiveness, that rules of law must be so fashioned as to
protect honest witnesses from hasty and spiteful retaliation in the form of un-
[Vol. 66:2
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The two-witness rule thus prevents a perjury conviction based solely on
a swearing match between the defendant and a single government
witness.
A corollary of the two-witness rule is the inconsistent statement
rule, a much-criticized rule of pleading and proof that applies when the
defendant himself has made two or more contradictory sworn state-
ments. The rule has two prongs, one applying to the indictment and
one to the proof required of the prosecution. The indictment must
specify which of the defendant's inconsistent statements is alleged to be
false; it cannot simply charge that, as a matter of logical necessity, one of
them was false.2 ' In proving the falsity of the statement charged, more-
over, the prosecution must adduce some corroboration in addition to
the defendant's sworn contradictory statement.
22
The extent to which these common law evidentiary rules actually
founded perjury prosecutions .... The rule may originally have stemmed from
quite different reasoning, but implicit in its evolution and continued vitality has
been the fear that innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or convicted in
perjury prosecutions if a less stringent rule were adopted.
323 U.S. at 608-10. See also United States v. Diggs, 560 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 925 (1977) (two-witness rule still applies to prosecutions under the General Per-
jury Statute after passage of the False Declaration Statute).
21. See United States v. Buckner, 118 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1941).
22. See Cuesta v. United States, 230 F.2d 704, 707-08 (5th Cir. 1956) (defendant's
sworn oral admission of the falsity of his sworn written application for registry as an alien
was not sufficient evidence of perjury without corroboration of falsity); United States v.
Nessanbaum, 205 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1953) (dictum); McWhorter v. United States, 193 F.2d
982 (5th Cir. 1952); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 8.
It would appear that the seminal case from which the federal rule evolved was system-
atically misread. McWhorter cited United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430,438 (1840),
for the rule that proof of defendant's contradictory sworn statements alone is insufficient
to prove perjury. 193 F.2d at 983. Yet Wood does not support that rule. In Wood, the
defendant was charged with perjury in preparing invoices. The proof of falsity was limited
to written correspondence from the defendant. No corroborating witness testified. The
Court noted the existence of the two-witness rule, but held that the purpose of the rule
was satisfied by the evidence presented, which came from the defendant himself. In dic-
tum, the Court cited Rex v. KniUl (referred to in Rex v. Harris, 5 Barn. & Aid. 926, 929
(1822)) for the rule that a single witness is sufficient to establish perjury if he testifies that
the defendant testified to contradictory statements. In Knill, the defendant was charged
with having committed perjury in testimony before the House of Lords. The defendant
had testified inconsistently before a committee of the House of Commons. The evidence
was limited to proof of the contradictory oaths. The conviction was affirmed despite the
absence of a second witness, the court holding that contradiction by the party himself was
sufficient. In Rex v. Harris, the court reversed a conviction upon similar facts because the
prosecution had not specified in the charge which of the two statements was false, but had
simply alleged that they were inconsistent and that one or the other must have been false.
The Harris court reasoned that the ambiguity of the charge would not permit the defend-
ant to plead acquittal in the suit as a bar to a subsequent charge of having committed
perjury in making one or the other of the statements alone.
Although United States v. Wood does not establish that a defendant's sworn contradic-
tory statements alone are insufficient to prove the falsity of his testimony, post-Wood deci-
sions in England did hold that the defendant's sworn inconsistent statement alone was
insufficient to satisfy the two-witness rule. R. v. Wheatland, 8 C.& P. 238 (1838); see gener-
ally 11 HALSBURY's LAws OF ENGLAND § 950 (4th ed. 1976) and cases cited therein; 12
HALSBURY'S STATUTES 192 (4th ed. 1985) (Perjury Act of 1911 § 13). However, McWhorter
and its progeny apparently ignored the effect of the rules announced in Wood, i.e. that,
although the prosecution is required to charge and prove which of the two inconsistent
statements was false, once the prosecution charges that one of the statements is false, the
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impair federal prosecutions for perjury is uncertain. Critics of the Gen-
eral Perjury Statute have argued that the two-witness rule and the incon-
sistent statement rule seriously impede federal perjury prosecutions.
23
The rules have also been subject to theoretical challenge. Discount-
ing any special problem in regulating perjury, critics argue that the two-
witness rule requires corroboration that is unnecessary for proof of
other, more serious, crimes.2 4 They see the inconsistent statement rule
as pointlessly forcing the prosecutor and the jury to guess which state-
ment was false when, as a matter of logic, one of them must have been.
25
From the critics' point of view, prosecutorial efficiency and logic tri-
umphed with the passage of the False Declaration Statute.
B. The False Declaration Statute
The False Declaration Statute prohibits false swearing in federal
court and grand jury proceedings.2 6 Congress enacted the statute as
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 with the announced
intention of making perjury convictions easier to obtain than they had
been under the General Perjury Statute, 2 7 thereby improving the relia-
bility of evidence given in federal court and grand jury proceedings
defendant's contradictory statement is sufficient under the two-witness rule to establish
falsity.
The inconsistent statement rule was not followed in several state cases, and Wigmore
opined that it was not the prevailing rule in non-federal jurisdictions. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2042.
Just as the two-witness rule acquired a new rationale after its original rationale
withered away, Cf O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 32 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("[W]hen
ancient rules maintain themselves ... new reasons more fitted to the time have been found
for them .... ) the inconsistent statement rule also finds support in other arguments.
One such justification is that inconsistent statements do not necessarily imply perjury. A
witness may testify inconsistently at different times because his recollection or opinion
changed in the interim or because of mistake or misunderstanding. Mere proof that the
defendant testified inconsistently does not establish that he made either statement without
a belief that it was true. Despite this justification, however, the inconsistent statement rule
might prove frustrating in rare cases in which the nature of the inconsistency makes it clear
that the witness uttered an intentional falsehood but the prosecution has no independent
proof as to which of the statements was false in order to satisfy the two-witness rule.
23. As evidence they cited the relative paucity of federal prosecutions for perjury.
24. See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2041 ("In modern times, cogent reasons have been
given for believing that the rule has outlived its usefulness."); New York Law Revision Com-
mission, 1935 Report, Legis. Doc. 322 (1935).
25. See United States v. Goldberg, 290 F.2d 729, 734 n. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
899 (1961) ("It is hard to see why in a case where, e.g., two or more witnesses testified that
the defendant, repeatedly and under varying cirmustances, had made statements differing
from his sworn testimony, ajury could not be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not believe that latter to be true."). See also, WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2043;
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 9.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982). Subsection (a) provides as follows:
(a) Whoever under oath ... in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or
grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration...
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
The statute also prohibits the use of false documents in federal court and grand jury
proceedings. This article will discuss only the provisions relating to false swearing. It
could be argued that the use of false documents evidences a greater degree of conscious
intention to mislead and so is not subject to the problems discussed in this article.
27. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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against organized crime figures. 2 8 The False Declaration Statute was to
make convictions for perjury more easy to obtain by defining a new spe-
cies of perjury, false declaration, to which the "outmoded" evidentiary
rules of the General Perjury Statute would not apply.2 9 The premise of
the legislation was simple: by increasing the likelihood that a perjurer
would be convicted, the statute would increase the risks associated with
perjury and thereby reduce its occurrence. 30 It is, of course, this prem-
ise that is in doubt, given the potential counterproductivity of perjury
statutes.
The elements of the False Declaration Statute are as rigorous as
those of the General Perjury Statute, although there are some changes
in operative language. The False Declaration Statute prohibits a federal
witness from knowingly3 l making a "false declaration." The defendant
28. Id.
29. See supra note 14. "Title IV eliminates outmoded evidentiary restrictions in prose-
cutions of those who give false testimony in grand jury or court proceeding [sic]." Hearings
Before the Sub-Committee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on theJudiciary on
S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292, 91st
CONG. lST SESS. 3 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings] (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
30. In committee hearings, witnesses favoring the legislation testified that if the gov-
ernment could more easily obtain convictions for perjury, witnesses would be less likely to
succumb to illicit pressure to testify falsely. Government prosecutors were said to have
been often frustrated by witnesses who testified favorably to the government in grand jury
proceedings, then changed their story because of intimidation or for other reasons at the
ensuing criminal trials. The government wanted its own counter-pressure, a licit threat
with which to confront the wavering witness. In addition, it was argued that making per-
jury convictions easier to obtain would permit the government to enforce the immunized
witness's obligation to testify truthfully under the Act's witness immunity provisions. The
immunity provisions contained in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 are found at
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1986). It was thought that facilitation of perjury prosecutions was es-
sential to insure truthful testimony by immunized witnesses:
The criminal law must offer more effective deterrents against false statements.
The integrity of the trial depends on the power to compel truthful testimony and
to punish falsehood. Immunity can be an effective prosecution weapon only if the
immunized witness then testifies truthfully. Perjury statutes provide criminal
penalties for false testimony under oath, but the infrequency of their use and the
difficulty of securing convictions in perjury cases has limited the effectiveness of
this criminal sanction.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society
(quoted in Hearings, supra note 29, at 335).
31. The legislative history suggests that the change in the level of intent from "will-
fully" to "knowingly" was intended to have no substantive effect. See S. REP No. 617 at
149 ("language changes have been made in the provision [on intent] as introduced to
achieve economy of words"). Compare United States v. Stassi, 443 F. Supp 661, 666 (D.N.J.
1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 122 (1978) (rejecting defendant's argument that his statements were
not knowingly false, the court said: "the mens rea element of'knowingly' does not apply to
whether the statements were false but rather to how they were made. (citations omitted).
The requirement dictates that only knowing, intentional or voluntary (as opposed to in-
advertant or accidental) statements be the subject of prosecution.") and United States v.
Watson, 623 F.2d 1198, 1206 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding refusal to give jury instruction
that false declaration must be willful) with United States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910, 914-15 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975) (noting that the mens rea element was changed, with-
out comment on the substatntive effect of the change) and United States v. Lardieri, 497
F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1974) (approving instruction for prosecution under subsection (a)
stating that "knowing" means with knowledge of the falsity of the statement). This ques-
tion will be discussed further in Part II-A.
In contrast to the General Perjury Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982), the witness's "be-
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must have knowledge of the falsity of the statement.3 2 Consistent with
prior law, the statute explicitly requires the prosecution to prove that
the matter asserted in the defendant's statement was objectively false.
33
The lightening of the prosecutor's burden occurred not in the elements
of the crime but in the evidentiary rules.
1. Relaxation of Evidentiary Rules
Subsection (e) of the statute abandons the two-witness rule alto-
gether by providing that proof of false declaration need not be by any
particular number of witnesses or type of evidence.3 4 The government
need only prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
This section permits proof of the falsity of the defendant's testi-
mony to be established by the uncorroborated testimony of a single wit-
ness, making proof of false declaration similar to that of most other
crimes. In theory, subsection (e) also permits a conviction based solely
on an inconsistent statement made by the defendant, whether sworn or
not, if evidence of such a statement would permit the trier of fact to find
the sworn statement to have been false beyond a reasonable doubt.
While the foregoing provision permits the government to convict a
defendant of false declaration based solely on the witness's inconsistent
statement, it does not solve the problem presented by the need to
choose which of two inconsistent statements is charged to be false. This
matter is taken up in subsection (c) of the statute, which lessens the gov-
ernment's pleading and proof requirements in cases in which the de-
fendant has made inconsistent statements under oath. Under the
statute, an indictment or information sufficiently charges false declara-
tion by alleging that the defendant knowingly made two or more sworn
declarations "which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is
necessarily false .... -35 The prosecution need not allege which of the
statements was false. Likewise, at trial the prosecution need not prove
which of the two inconsistent declarations was false.3 6 Proof of their




The False Declaration Statute provides for two defenses to charges
lief" in the truth of the statement is referred to only once, in the inconsistent statement
provision discussed below.
32. United States v. Dudley, 581 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978). But see infra Part II-C-I-a
(discussion of the inconsistent statement provision in which such knowledge may not need
to be proved when the witness has testified inconsistently).
33. United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1976).
34. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction.
It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or
by documentary or other type of evidence." 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (1982).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982).
36. Id.
37. Id. This provision reverses the McWhorter rule.
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made under the statute. As an incentive to correct false testimony,3 8 the
statute permits an affirmative defense of recantation to a charge of false
declaration. Recantation, or retraction, refers to the witness's statement
that his previous testimony was false. A defense of retraction or recanta-
tion was not recognized under the General Perjury Statute. Although
some common law decisions barred conviction for perjury if the defend-
ant had corrected the falsehood in the same proceeding in which it had
been given,3 9 in United States v. Norris,4 0 the Supreme Court held that the
crime of perjury was "completed" at the time of the false utterance and
that recantation was no defense to a charge of perjury under the federal
statute.
4 1
Subsection (d) changes the Norris rule for the crime of false
declaration:
(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury pro-
ceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the
declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission
shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the ad-
mission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected
the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity
has been or will be exposed.
4 2
The recantation provision was modeled on a similar provision in the
New York criminal code.43 The Model Penal Code contains a similar
retraction provision.4 4 Under both the New York and Model Penal
Code perjury statutes, the defense, if successful, bars prosecution for
perjury. But because the False Declaration Statute did not displace the
General Perjury Statute, the defense afforded by its recantation provi-
sion does not apply to prosecutions under the General Perjury
Statute.
4 5
The statute provides an additional affirmative defense to a charge of
having made inconsistent sworn statements. This defense is set out in
subsection (c) which provides that it "shall be a defense to an indictment
38. "[The recantation provision] serves as an inducement to the witness to give truth-
ful testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without incurring
the risk of prosecution by doing so." 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4024 (1970). See
also same source at 4008, 4023 (the sole purpose of the recantation defense is to en-
courage the discovery of truth in judicial and grand jury proceedings) United States v.
Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v.
Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319, 324 ("Section 1623 deters perjury in the first instance by punish-
ing it, and encourages the correction of false testimony by barring prosecution if a witness
recants before he knows his lie will be exposed or before the proceeding has been substan-
tially affected.") United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 617 (5th Cir. 1981).
39. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 627 and cases cited therein.
40. 300 U.S. 564, 574-76 (1937).
41. Id.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1982).
43. This provision adopts in modified form a New York statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 210.25 (McKinney, 1988); 2 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4023-24 (1970).
44. "No person shall be guilty of an offense under this Section if he retracted the
falsification in the course of the proceeding in which it was made before it became manifest
that the falsification was or would be exposed and before the falsification substantially
affected the proceeding." MODEL PENAL CODE, § 241.1(4) (1980).
45. See infra notes 118-19.
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or information made [under subsection (c)] that the defendant at the
time he made each declaration believed that the declaration was true."
4 6
The relationship between this defense and the government's affirmative
obligation to prove that the defendant knowingly made a false statement
is discussed in the next subsection.
C. Treatment of Inconsistent Testimony Under the Federal Perjury Statutes
As part I of the article suggested, perjury is difficult to regulate in
part because of the conflict between the deterrence and mitigation goals
of the justice system: to inhibit perjury is to discourage rectification of
testimonial error. Inconsistent testimony is especially sensitive to this
conflict because, although it can provide strong evidence of perjury, it is
nevertheless the only way in which a witness can correct the harm done
by his previous testimony. As one would expect, therefore, the deter-
rence and mitigation interests of perjury law clash most clearly in the
statutory treatment of inconsistent testimony.
The two federal perjury statutes treat inconsistent testimony in op-
posite ways. Under the General Perjury Statute, the two-witness rule
and the inconsistent statement rule tend to make testimonial correction
less risky for a witness. The government may charge that either state-
ment was perjurious, but is required to corroborate by some additional
evidence the falsity of the statement charged. 4 7 The government also
bears the burden of proving the defendant's lack of belief in the false
statement.48 Nevertheless, by refusing to acknowledge the defense of
recantation, 4 9 the General Perjury Statute discourages testimonial cor-
rections whenever the witness believes that the correction would corrob-
orate other evidence of the falsity of the former testimony, thereby
satisfying the two-witness rule.
The False Declaration Statute reverses this approach: under sub-
section (c) certain forms of inconsistent testimony constitute conclusive
evidence of falsehood, while under subsection (d) other forms of incon-
sistent testimony will give the witness a defense of recantation. The
False Declaration Statute thus makes testimonial revision less risky, but
only if it can be characterized as recantation. Otherwise, it is more risky
because of the reduced pleading and proof requirements of subsection
(c).
In order to analyze the combined behavioral effects of these stat-
utes, it is necessary to look more closely at the basis for the radically
different treatment accorded recantation and other inconsistent state-
ments under the False Declaration Statute. The following analysis sug-
gests that these two categories of testimony are, for most practical
purposes, equivalent. They are treated differently not because they are
of different values to the judicial system but because they symbolize the
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982).
47. See supra note 23.
48. See supra note 18.
49. See supra note 43.
[Vol. 66:2
TESTIMONIAL CONSISTENCY
two sides of the unresolved conflict between the deterrence and mitiga-
tion policies of the statute.
1. The Inconsistent Statement Provision
By permitting the government, in effect, to plead and prove false
declaration in the alternative when the defendant has testified inconsis-
tently, the inconsistent statement provision 50 prevents a defendant who
obviously lied on one of two occasions from avoiding prosecution be-
cause the trier of fact cannot determine upon which occasion he lied.
The provision rests on the tautology that when a witness utters "two or
more declarations, which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them
is necessarily false [sic]," 5 ' the witness has uttered a false declaration.
While the requisite degree of inconsistency alone might permit an infer-
ence that one of the statements was false, however, it does not establish
that the falsity was intentional. 52 The inference of intent will depend
50. (c) An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging that, in
any proceedings before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States, the defendant under oath has knowingly made two or more declarations,
which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, need
not specify which declaration is false if-
(1) each declaration was material to the point in question, and
(2) each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limitations
for the offense charged under this section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the
indictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof
that the defendant while under oath made irreconcilable contradictory declara-
tions material to the point in question in any proceeding before or ancillary to
any court or grand jury. It shall be a defense to an indictment or information
made pursuant to the first sentance of this subsection that the defendant at the
time he made each declaration believed the declaration to be true.
18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982).
Compare the inconsistent statement provision of the Model Penal Code:
Where the defendant made inconsistent statements under oath or equivalent
affirmation, both having been made within the period of the statute of limitations,
the prosecution may proceed by setting forth the inconsistent statements in a
single count alleging in the alternative that one or the other was false and not
believed by the defendant. In such a case it shall not be necessary for the prose-
cution to prove which statement was false but only that one or the other was false
and not believed by the defendant to be true.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(5) (1980).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982). One presumes that the adverb "necessarily" modifies
"is" rather than "false." Only self-contradictory statements are necessarily false.
52. It should be noted that the standard of inconsistency set forth in the statute is not
as self-evident or easy to apply as one might imagine. Consider:
1. No two non-contemporaneous statements purporting to describe a witness's
recolleciton of an event can ever meet the statutory requirement that one of them was
necessarily false when made. Regardless of the form that factual testimony takes, it can
only describe the witness's contemporaneous recollection. An exception might be state-
ments of contemporaneous perception. But no two of these could be contradictory be-
cause they would describe perceptions at different times. "The light was red" is
understood to mean "My present recollection is that the light was red," although the latter
expression conventionally suggests that the recollection is weak. Indeed, a witness's at-
tempt to testify to anything other than his recollection of his perceptions would ordinarily
be inadmissible as either opinion or speculation. Cf FED. R. EviD. 602 (requirement that
testimony be based on witness's personal knowledge); 701 (lay opinions inadmissible un-
less based on perception). Because statements of past facts describe only the witness's
current recollection, non-contemporaneous factual statements made by the same witness
about the same event actually describe different mental states. Thus, no two statements
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instead upon such factors as the nature of the matter testified to, the
about a witness's recollection can ever come into direct conflict. See United States v. Flow-
ers, 813 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1987), in which the court held that two contradictory state-
ments concerning an event were not inconsistent within the meaning of the statute when
the witness also testified that his memory of the event had changed.
Such a strict reading of "necessarily false" in the inconsistent statement provision
would render it nugatory. In order to avoid the problem of under-inclusiveness that this
argument creates, one might argue that the statute refers only to inconsistency between
the statements of matter recollected. This reading, however, quickly leads to problems of
over-inclusiveness because it conflicts with the central idea that witnesses are asked about
and testify to their recollection of events rather than to the events themselves. It strains
credulity to believe that subsection (c) is to come into play whenever a witness's recollec-
tion changes.
The Model Penal Code seeks to avoid this problem by using the idea of rational in-
compatibility. MODEL PENAL CODE Comment 241.1(8) (1980):
Finally, it should be noted that the word 'inconsistent' is preferable to 'contradic-
tory' in the statutory formulation, since statements may be rationally incompati-
ble without literal contradiction. It is, according to the definition of 'statement' in
Section 241.0(2), the total impact of the 'representation' made by the defendant
that is to be considered in a perjury prosecution. Inconsistent representations
need not literally contradict one another in order for the total picture conveyed
by the witness to be quite different from one occasion to another.
The total picture test, however, does not meet the statutory standard that requires
one of the statements to have been "necessarily" false. Although this test would overcome
the problem of the under-inclusiveness of logical inconsistency, it would create the oppo-
site problem of overbreadth by loosening the definition far too much. The "total picture"
of a witness's testimony can change dramatically when facts are added or different lan-
guage is used, without any false statements being uttered. Moreover, because reasonable
minds can often differ about whether two statements are rationally inconsistent, such state-
ments would not be "necessarily" inconsistent as required by the federal statute.
The possibility of rapid memory loss would never seem to be "necessarily" excluded,
as the statute seems to require. This problem of under-inclusiveness can be avoided only
by expanding the notion of "necessarily false" to include weaker forms of inconsistency,
which would risk removing the certitude that the statutory standard provides.
2. Consistency or inconsistency may not be self-evident from the statements them-
selves but may instead depend upon facts unexpressed in the statements but assumed to
be true, for example, "Mr. Bush attended the meeting" and "The President did not attend
the meeting." These statements are inconsistent because of the unexpressed fact that Mr.
Bush is the President. Such essential unexpressed facts may not, however, always be so
clear or undisputed. If the unexpressed facts were uttered by the defendant under oath,
they should be included in the indictment: the provision refers to two or more inconsis-
tent statements, apparently covering the situation in which no two of the defendant's state-
ments are inconsistent without taking into account additional statements. For instance,
"The President attended the briefing," "The President did not know of the plan," "The
plan was disclosed at the meeting," and "The President knew of all plans disclosed at the
meeting." No two of these statements contradict each other, but one statement of the four
must be false.
The statute's failure to specify whether and to what extent extraneous information can
be taken into account in determining the degree of inconsistency the statements contain is
much more troublesome when the extraneous evidence does not come from statements
made by the defendant and the defendant does not admit the truth of the extraneous
evidence necessary to such a determination. Because it acts as a substitute proof of falsity,
which the government would otherwise be required to establish to the jury, the inconsis-
tent statement provision should not apply to statements whose inconsistency depends
upon the acceptance of extraneous evidence whose truth is open to rational question.
3. The inconsistent statement provision does not clearly define where one statement
leaves off and the next begins. This failure leads to ambiguity when a witness's testimony
might be characterized as either a single self-contradictory or incoherent statement or as
two inconsistent statements. The statute does not refer to the time between the inconsis-
tent statements, making it possible that it either reaches corrections made in the same
breath or does not reach corrections made days later.
The Model Penal Code's solution to this problem is to define "statement" to include
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specificity of the testimony, the witness's certainty and demeanor on the
stand, the passage of time between the statements, the narrative context
of the statements, the clarity of the questioning, the surrounding facts
assumed by the trier to be true, and the defendant's explanation, if any,
for the inconsistency. Thus, proof of inconsistent statements per se does
not establish the mens rea element of the false declaration statute. Yet, to
an extent not yet made wholly clear by judicial construction, the incon-
sistent statement provision permits proof of inconsistency to replace
proof of knowingly false declaration.
Because the degree of inconsistency, logical or rational, is the same
for innocent as well as perjurious inconsistencies, the only way to rescue
innocent revisions from the operation of the statute is to require the
prosecution to prove that the false statement in a pair of inconsistent
statements was knowingly false when made. Two statutory provisions
bear on the question. Subsection (a) in defining false declaration refers
to one who "knowingly makes any false material declaration."' 5 3 This
provision requires the government to prove that the defendant knew of
the falsity of the statement.
54
But the inconsistent statement provision permits the burden of pro-
duction of evidence on this element of the offense to be shifted to the
defendant once inconsistent statements are proved. That provision re-
fers to one who "has knowingly made two or more declarations, which
are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false."
The sentence is ambiguous in that this "knowingly" might refer to the
making of the statements, the logical inconsistency between the state-
ments, or the actual falsity of one of the statements. Subsection (a) im-
plies that "knowingly" in subsection (c) refers to the actual falsity of one
of the statements, thus requiring the prosecution to prove knowledge in
addition to inconsistency. If "knowingly" in subsection (c) refers only to
the making of the statements or the fact of their inconsistency, then sub-
section (a)'s mens rea requirement would be evaded.
Yet, one court has indeed held that "knowingly" in subsection (c)
refers only to the making of the statements. In United States v. Stassi,
55
the defendant was convicted of having made inconsistent sworn state-
ments in a guilty plea proceeding and in an affidavit on a motion to
vacate the plea. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
government had not proved that his statements were knowingly false,
the total impression left by the witness's testimony. "[S]tatement means any representa-
tion .... MODEL PENAL CODE § 24 1.0(2). A representation is:
[T]he total impression conveyed by a sequence of declarations by the accused
rather than the literal content of a single sentence taken from the sequence ....
Thus, even though a single declaration in the course of a series of questions was
false, the 'representation' for purposes of perjury would be the total impression
conveyed by the answers as a whole.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment b.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1982).
54. See United States v. Crippen, 570 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1069 (1979).
55. 443 F. Supp 661 (1977).
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stating: "[T]he mens rea element of 'knowingly' does not apply to
whether the statements were false but rather to how they were made....
The requirement dictates that only knowing, intentional or voluntary (as
opposed to inadvertent or accidental) statements be the subject of pros-
ecution." '5 6 The court held that, unless a defendant adequately raises
the affirmative defense of belief in the truth of the statements, the gov-
ernment need not prove that they were made with knowledge of their
falsity. 5 7 Slassi holds that proof of inconsistent statements alone dis-
charges the government's prima facie burden of proof of the element of
intent. 5 8 This holding implies that the defendant is not even entitled to
an instruction on the defense of belief in the truth of the statements
unless he adduces some evidence of that intent.
The result of Stassi is that, upon the government's proof that the
defendant made sworn inconsistent statements, the burden of produc-
ing evidence bearing on knowledge of falsity shifts to the defendant.
5 9
Although knowledge of falsity is an element of the offense of false decla-
ration, Stassi requires the prosecution to prove knowledge only if the
defendant adequately raises the defense that he believed in the truth of
each statement when it was made.6 0  Shifting the burden of producing
evidence to the defendant as to an element of the crime before the gov-
ernment has proved that element is of doubtful constitutionality.
While a statute's allocation of the burdens of proof and production
of evidence offends a defendant's fifth amendment due process right if it
has the effect of relieving the government of proving one of the ele-
ments of the crime charged,6 1 the Court has not determined whether or
56. Id.
57. Id. at 667.
58. Id.
59. In addition to knowledge and materiality, the government must show falsity.
Defendant argues convincingly that the government has not proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant knew that the June 22, 1976 affidavit was false
when it was signed and sworn to. The court agrees. Indeed, the government's
burden in this situation is greater than even the defendant suggests. Once a de-
fendant raises the affirmative defense of his belief in the truth of a statement, the
burden is on the government to disprove this belief beyond a reasonable doubt.
[citation omitted] However, success on this issue does not serve to exonerate the
defendant from the charges against him. Under § 1623(c), the government may
prove that one of the statements was necessarily false merely by introducing two
irreconcilably contradictory declarations to the point in question. [citation omit-
ted] The defendant in the two-statement situation must then demonstrate or at least raise the
issue that he believed each declaration to have been true at the time it was made. [citation
omitted] While the defendant has sufficiently demonstrated his belief in the ve-
racity of the June 22, 1976 statement, he has not presented any evidence toward
his belief that the June 2, 1975 declarations were true when they were made.
Indeed the argument defendant puts forward which tends to show his belief in the veracity of
the latter statement also demonstrates the defendant's belief in the falsity of the former
declarations.
Stassi, 443 F. Supp at 666-67 (emphasis added). This suggests that, to be entitled to an
instruction on the belief defense, the defendant must meet the burden of production of
evidence on the issue.
60. Id.
61. The fifth amendment due process clause, U.S. CoNsT. Amend. V, requires that the
government prove each element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (the due process clause "protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
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in what circumstances shifting the burden of production of evidence
bearing on an element of a crime might violate due process. 62 Such a
presumption might well be held violative of due process because, while
it operates, it has the prohibited effect of relieving the government of
tute the crime with which he is charged." [emphasis added]). See also Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952):
[Tihe trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the
law raises a presumption of intent from an act .... A conclusive presumption
which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as an in-
gredient of the offense. A presumption which would permit but not require the
jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion which the
jury should reach of its own volition. A presumption which would permit the jury
to make an assumption which all the evidence considered together does not logi-
cally establish would give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. [foot-
note omitted]. In either case, this presumption would conflict with the overriding
presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which ex-
tends to every element of the crime.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 274-75.
Evidentiary presumptions that have the effect of relieving the prosecution of this bur-
den have been held to violate due process. See also Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 698-701 (1975) (State may not redefine elements of crime as punishment factors
thereby relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving them) Cf Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (conviction of second degree murder does not violate due pro-
cess by placing burden on defendant to prove affirmative defense where defense does not
negative any fact essential to conviction of crime, although there are limits beyond which
the state cannot go in reallocating burdens of proof by labeling elements of the crime as
affirmative defenses.)
In conducting this analysis, the Court has distinguished between mandatory and per-
missive presumptions. A mandatory presumption may be either conclusive or rebuttable.
A conclusive mandatory presumption "removes the presumed element from the case once
the State has proven the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption." Francis v. Frank-
lin, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2. A conclusive mandatory presumption as to an element of the
crime is unconstitutional. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 517. A rebuttable
mandatory presumption requires the jury to find the presumed element upon proof of the
predicate facts unless the defendant persuades the jury otherwise. Francis at 314. Such a
presumption is also unconstitutional.
Stassi denies that the statute creates a mandatory presuption by affirming that the
prosecution must prove knowlege of falstity. "Once a defendant raises the affirmative de-
fense of his belief in the truth of a statement, the burden is on the government to disprove
this belief beyond a reasonable doubt." Stassi, 443 F. Supp at 666-67.
A permissive presumption permits, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an
element of the offense from proof of some other fact. Such presumptions are constitu-
tional so long as there is a rational connection between the element inferred and the fact
proved. Francis at 314-15; Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
62. A mandatory presumption may shift the burden of production by requiring that
the jury find the presumed fact unless the defendant produces some evidence of its non-
existance, and only thereafter putting the burden of proof of the element on the prosecu-
tion. The Court has not determined under what circumstances such a presumption shift-
ing the burden of production to the defendant would be unconstitutional. Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314 n.3; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 230 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); see also WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2487, 2512.
Characterizing the element as a defense on which the defendant has the burden of
proof has been held to be unconstitutional when the element is a natural element of the
crime charged, as has characterizing the element as a factor to be considered upon sen-
tencing. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra note 62. The defendant's belief in the truth of the
statement is nothing more than the negative of the element of knowledge of the falsity of
the statement. The False Declaration Statute cannot, under the guise of establishing an
element of the affirmative defense of belief, constitutionally compel the defendant to
shoulder the burden of negativing the element of knowledge of falsity.
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the burden of proving an element of the offense. 63 Moreover, under
Stassi, in order to discharge the burden of production, the defendant
must introduce some evidence of his belief in the truth of both of his
statements. 64 This almost certainly requires the defendant to take the
stand, waiving his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Regardless of the constitutionality of the statute under the Stassi
rule, there is no doubt that a witness will face a difficult task in attempt-
ing to invoke the defense of belief in the truth of the inconsistent state-
ments. This chilling effect applies to innocent witnesses contemplating
testimonial corrections as well as to potential perjurers. The witness
must produce some evidence that he believes both statements to have
been true when made. Any evidence tending to show that the witness
believed one of the statements tends to make it less likely that he be-
lieved the other one.6 5 The witness will usually have no objective evi-
dence of his belief; his personal credibility will be determinative of the
issue.
Congress expressly denied that the inconsistent statement provision
relieves the government of the burden of proving intent to falsify. 6 6
Stassi's may have read the provision differently because the court could
not understand how the government could discharge such a burden
when, as is likely, one of the inconsistent statements was true when
made. It is impossible for the government to prove a defendant's knowl-
edge of falsity of a true statement. The government might, however,
prove with respect to each statement that if it was false, then the defend-
ant knew that it was false when he made it.
It is suggested that the proper reading of the statute is that the
defendant may be convicted of false declaration upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) that he made sworn statements [otherwise qualify-
ing] that were so inconsistent that one of them must have been false
when made and, (2) that whichever one was false, the defendant must
have known it to have been false when made. This formulation would
63. But see Mlullaney, 421 U.S. at 703 n.31 (suggesting that shifting the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant may be subject to less stringent due process requirements than
shifting the burden of persuasion); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 231 in whichJustice Powell opines
that shifting the burden of production may be permissible on such issues as malice, citing
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13, comment, p. 110 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The Official Draft
of the Model Penal Code, however, seems to limit permissible shifts in the burden of pro-
duction to affirmative defenses, not elements of the crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1)
& (3).
64. Stassi, 443 F. Supp at 666-67. It is possible that a burden of production could be
met by evidence put in by the prosecution or by inferences from other evidence put in by
the defendant. See supra note 63. However, Stassi implies that discharging this burden
would require evidence of more than the inference that any witness under oath believed
that what he said was true.
65. Id.
66. Under present law, even if a witness makes two statements which are so pa-
tently contradictory that one or the other must be false, the prosecution must
nevertheless prove which of the statements is false and then prove an intentional
falsehood. In accord with the commission recommentdation, the committee
rightfully retained the requirement that an intent to falsify be shown. However, if
one of two statements logically must be false, then title IV recognized that fact.
116 CONG. REC. 589 (1970).
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permit alternative pleading and proof without changing the govern-
ment's affirmative burden of proof and production as to any of the ele-
ments of the offense.
If this reading is correct, however, then the statutory defense that
the defendant believed each statement to have been true when made is
superfluous because it simply denies one of the elements of the crime
that the prosecution must prove anyway. The defendant cannot prove
that he believed to be true what the government proves that he knew to
be false.6 7 If the government fails to meet the burden of proving that
the defendant must have known of the falsity of the false statement when
he made it, the defendant should be acquitted.
2. The Statutory Treatment of Recantation
The recantation provision permits the witness to bar prosecution
for a false declaration by making a timely admission that the declaration
was false. In contrast to subsection (c)'s disincentives for inconsistent
statements, the recantation provision is supposed to serve as "an incen-
tive to the witness to give truthful testimony by permitting him volunta-
rily to correct a false statement without incurring the risk of prosecution
by doing so."1
6 8
Two problems attend the recantation defense: its inconsistency
with the inconsistent statement provision and the judicial and statutory
barriers that have frustrated its achievement of its legislative purpose.
(a) Recantation versus Inconsistent Statement
The sharp contrast between the statute's treatment of "inconsistent
statements" and "recantations" requires courts to differentiate between
the two. But such a distinction is difficult to draw. A recantation obvi-
ously denies the truth of the statement recanted. Since any recantation
is inconsistent with the statement recanted, every recantation and the
statement it recants satisfy subsection (c)'s definition of inconsistent
statements: either the recantation or the statement recanted must nec-
essarily be false. Conversely, every statement admits, at least implicitly,
the falsity of any contradictory statement previously made; the latter of
any two inconsistent statements thus implicitly recants the former. In
substance, all recantations are inconsistent statements, and vice versa.
The statute does not permit both subsections to be applied to the
same pair of statements made in the same proceeding. 69 If recantations
67. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 3 (1980).
68. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4024 (1970).
69. Subsection (c) will not conflict with subsection (d) unless both provisions could
apply to the same statement. Since a recantation must occur-within the same continuous
proceeding and must be timely, for example, only subsection (c) can apply to inconsistent
statements made in different proceedings or result from recantation which is untimely.
On the other side, it might be possible to recant without uttering an inconsistent
statement. Subsection (c) requires that the inconsistent statements be made under oath,
but this is not expressly required by subsection (d) for recantations. Thus, an unsworn
recantation would not constitute an inconsistent statement. See United States v. Crandall,
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were inconsistent statements, then they would not bar prosecution. If
inconsistent statements were recantations, then they could not be prose-
cuted. Courts must therefore endeavor to distinguish the admission
required by the recantation provision from a simple inconsistent state-
ment. Federal courts have had numerous occasions to struggle with this
problem in cases where defendants charged with having made inconsis-
tent statements sought to characterize them as recantations.
Whether or not a statement constitutes a recantation, i.e. an admis-
sion of the falsity of a previous statement, has been held to be a question
of law as to which the defendant has no right to a jury trial.7 0 In deter-
mining whether a statement constitutes a recantation, courts have con-
strued with uncommon strictness the requirement that the defendant
admit the falsity of the statement recanted. Although the statute does
not so provide, decisions have held that the recantation must be an ex-
plicit, unequivocal admission that the prior testimony was false. 7 1 The
requirement that the witness admit the falsity of the prior statement in
order to recant effectively has been construed to mean that an attempt at
recantation that explained the earlier statement as a mistake or an inno-
cent error is not effective.
72
These holdings mean that a witness who retracts an earlier inconsis-
tent statement and truthfully explains it as a mistake will not fulfill the
requirements of the recantation defense. Such a witness could recant
effectively only if she were to [falsely] admit that the earlier statement
363 F. Supp 648 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aft'd, 493 F.2d 1401, aff'd, 495 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974) (statement given to a prosecutor while the grand jury was in
recess held adequate as a recantation because the statement was read to the grand jury
when it reconvened, but held not to constitute an effective recantation on other grounds);
and United States v. D'Auria, 672 F.2d at 1091. But see United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d
1012, 1017 n.5 (1st Cir. 1983) (suggesting that the statement must be made directly to the
grand jury). These decisions suggest that a witness may recant grand jury testimony by
letter or other out-of-court statements to the prosecutor.
70. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1983); DAuria, 672 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1982).
Recantation has been held to be a jurisdictional bar to prosectution that must be raised in
a motion under FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2). United States v. Parr, 516 F.2d 458, 472 (5th
Cir. 1975); Denison, 663 F.2d at 618.
71. United States v. Brown, No. 84-5546 (D.C. Cir. March 24, 1986) (unpublished slip
opinion available in LEXIS) (although defendant's answers were sufficiently inconsistent
to satisfy subsection (c), the latter answer did not amount to an admission of falsity of the
former); Goguen, 723 F.2d at 1018 ("[F]or an effective recantation the accused must come
forward and explain unambiguously and specifically which of his answers in prior testi-
mony were false and in what respects they were false."); DAuria, 672 F.2d at 1092 (witness
must make an "outright retraction and repudiation").
In D'Auria the court affirmed the conviction of a grand jury witness whose counsel had
unsuccessfully requested permission for the witness to return to the grand jury to "add to
and clarify" his grand jury testimony, stating that he had not "completely understood"
some of the questions and wished to "come forward with any additional information he
could provide." The court held that this was too equivocal to constitute an adequate offer
to recant. The court read the statute as requiring that not only the recantation, but also
the offer to recant, must admit the falsity of the declaration in question.
72. See cases and discussion in note 70. Technically the original statement in such
cases was not a false declaration. Apparently for this reason, these decisions imply that a
witness may not bar prosecution for making a non-perjurious false statement. If the origi-
nal statement was intentionally false then subsequent testimony that it was an innocent
error is itself a false declaration.
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was intentionally false. Despite the legislative intent, the statute thus
provides no safe harbor for the honest witness seeking to rectify an in-
nocent error.
The decisions announcing such an interpretation arguably distort
the statutory language. The recantation provision requires only that the
defendant admit the falsity of the prior testimony, not that she embellish
the admission with further affirmative representations explaining how
she came to testify falsely. If the defendant offers such an explanation,
and it is false, then she may indeed have committed a second false decla-
ration, but that subsequent falsehood cannot change the legal effect of
her admission of falsity. The simple acknowledgment that the prior
statement was false will remedy any damaging effect it would have had
on the proceeding and should be sufficient for the defense of
recantation.
73
Thus far, case law has tried to keep the statute from coming un-
hinged by holding that a recantation avoids being an inconsistent state-
ment only by making an express allusion to the prior declaration. 74 For
example, if the witness first testified that "The light was red," and later
testified "My statement that the light was red was false" she would have
recanted, whereas if she later testified simply that "The light was not
red" she would have uttered inconsistent statements and committed
false declaration. 7 5 Thus, the court in United States v. Brown 76 held that a
statement that was sufficiently specific to constitute an inconsistent
statement contradicting former testimony did not constitute recantation
of that testimony because the witness did not also state that the former
testimony was false.
77
It is overwhelmingly likely that witnesses who have testified incon-
sistently with former testimony would, if asked, also readily admit that
the prior testimony was false. Few people will knowingly maintain posi-
tions that are so inconsistent that one of them is necessarily false. A
witness's failure to make an explicit statement that prior inconsistent
statements are false is a failure of form, not substance, and results from
the examiner's failure to draw the prior statement to the witness's atten-
tion. Thus, the classification of statements as inconsistent statements
instead of as recantations depends on the fortuity of the questions asked
rather than the answers given.
Such hyperformalism is to be expected when courts are required to
discriminate between functionally similar phenomena. Both inconsis-
tent statements and recantations inform the trier of fact that prior testi-
73. A second serious consequence of this interpretation of the statute is that a witness
must in effect admit guilt under the General Perjury Statute in order to bar prosecution
under the False Declaration Statute.
74. United States v. Brown, No. 84-5546 (unpublished slip opinion).
75. Note that an inconsistent statement can give the trier more information than the
formal recantation. Compare: (1) "My statement that the light was red was false"; with
(2) "The light was green."
76. No. 84-5546 (unpublished slip opinion).
77. Id.
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mony was false. Both recantations and inconsistent statements may be
either truthful attempts to correct the record or false attempts to deny
prior truthful testimony. Both inconsistent statements and recantations
leave the trier of fact to figure out which version of the events was true
and which was false. Both inconsistent statements and recantations may
be motivated by similar fears of exposure or similar desires to correct
innocent errors. Yet, because the statute attaches radically different
consequences to each, courts are driven to "find" differences between
them, implementing an inconsistent policy toward testimonial
inconsistency.
The "difference" between the two forms of testimonial inconsis-
tency is symbolic rather than functional and is rooted in the need of
perjury law to mediate between the values of deterrence and mitigation.
Courts seem to see the difference between inconsistent statements and
recantation as similar to the difference between bragging about one's sin
and confessing it, a difference in the witness's attitude rather than the
substance of the witness's communication. Such courts will sacrifice the
mitigative benefits of testimonial correction to achieve the punitive ef-
fect of contrition.
The Model Penal Code addresses the similarity of inconsistent
statements and retraction in applying its inconsistent statement provi-
sion.7 8 The Code seeks to rescue testimonial corrections from classifi-
cation as inconsistent statements provision by defining the term
"statement" 79 to be equivalent to the term "representation." This lat-
ter term is defined as "the total impression conveyed by a sequence of
declarations" and "the total impression conveyed by the answers as a
whole." 80 The Code Commentary opines that a witness who changes
his testimony in response to a single line of questioning will not be sub-
ject to prosecution for inconsistent statements: either he will be deemed
to have made only one statement or he will be deemed to have re-
canted.8 1 While superior to the federal scheme, this approach must
78. The Model Penal Code provides:
Inconsistent Statements. Where the defendant made inconsistent statements under
oath or equivalent affirmation, both having been made within the period of the
statute of limitations, the prosecution may proceed by setting forth the inconsis-
tent statements in a single count alleging in the alternative that one or the other
was false and not believed by the defendant. In such case it shall not be necessary
for the prosecution to prove which statement was false but only that one or the
other was false and not believed by the defendant.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1.
79. "[S]tatement means any representation, but includes a representation of opinion,
belief or other state of mind only if the representation clearly relates to state of mind apart
from or in addition to any facts which are the subject of the representation." MODEL PE-
NAL CODE, § 241.0(2).
80. Comment to the MODEL PENAL CODE, § 241.1.
81. It is not intended, of course, that a defendant who changes his story in re-
sponse to a single line of questioning thereby will subject himself automatically to
prosecution under Subsection (5) ... [E]ither the definition of "statement" or the
retraction defense should come into play to prevent such a prosecution. Indeed,
it might be suggested that in order for Subsection (5) to become operative, the
declarant's inconsistent statements should either have been given on different
occasions or at least pursuant to distinct lines of questioning.
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solve the problem of determining where an "occasion" or "line of ques-
tioning" ends. Does it end when the interrogator changes topics, when
the examination ends, when the cross-examination ends, or when the
witness leaves the stand? The proposed solution in Part IV avoids this
problem by referring solely to the proceeding in which the statements
occur.
(b) Barriers to Recantation
The conflicting policies of deterrence and mitigation are not only
expressed in distinctions between "bad" inconsistent statements and
"good" recantations. The conflict creates inconsistent attitudes toward
the recantation defense itself, both in the statutory language and the
courts. Congress limited the utility of the defense by erecting formal
barriers to its invocation. In addition, most courts have tended to view
the defense of recantation as an undeserved gift of grace to the perjurer
rather than as a Congressional recognition of the judicial system's inter-
est in obtaining evidence of even intentional misstatement before its
tribunals act. As a result, the courts have dispensed the benefit of the
defense with a grudging hand, rather than liberally to encourage correc-
tion of the record.
The statute requires that a recantation be timely in three ways: it
must occur during the same continuous proceeding as the false declara-
tion, it must occur before the false declaration has had a substantial ef-
fect on the proceeding, and it must occur before the exposure of the
falsity of the declaration has become manifest. While the purpose of
these requirements is to encourage rapid recantation, narrow judicial
interpretation has severely limited the availability of this defense.
The statutory requirement that the falsehood not have a substantial
effect on the proceeding demands an inquiry into whether, as a factual
matter, the falsehood has caused the tribunal to take or omit some ac-
tion in reliance upon the falsehood.8 2 In the absence of proof that the
falsehood affected the tribunal's process, the defendant presumably
should be encouraged to correct prior testimony. Otherwise, avoidable
injury to the judicial process could occur.
Decisions construing this provision, however, have precluded in-
quiry into causation. In United States v. Tucker 83 the court held that a
witness's false denial of criminal activity had substantially affected a
grand jury proceeding by causing the prosecution to grant immunity to
another witness in order to obtain the testimony it desired. The defend-
ant argued that, because the grant of immunity was unnecessary, the
grant was not caused by the perjury. The court rejected this argument,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 8, n.108.
82. New York precedent before and after enactment of the federal statute provides no
guidance as to the meaning of "substantially affect." Cf People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439,
440, 141 N.E.2d 580, 581, 161 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (1957) (suggesting that the deliberative or
investigative body must have been misled or deceived by the lie, and that the deception
harmed or prejudiced the deliberation or investigation-these are issues of fact).
83. 495 F. Supp 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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holding that the statute does not require a detailed inquiry into the
thought processes of grand jurors or into the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.
84
In United States v. Krogh,85 the court denied a motion to dismiss a
prosecution for false declaration made before a grand jury. The defend-
ant argued that an affidavit he had given to the prosecutor recanted the
falsehood. The court rejected the defense, finding that the grand jury
had acted before the recantation, although the opinion discloses no ef-
fect that the false testimony might have had on that action. The court
held that false statements are presumed as a matter of law to have been
considered by the grand jury and to have substantially affected the pro-
ceedings whenever the grand jury has acted following the false
testimony.
8 6
These holdings establishing a conclusive presumption that testi-
mony has had an effect on the proceeding ignore the language of the
statute. If Congress had intended to establish a presumption that any
action subsequently taken by the tribunal was substantially affected by
the false declaration, it surely could have so provided in the statute in-
stead of using language that stimulates a factual inquiry into proximate
cause. The restrictive reading of the statute instead reflects judicial
hostility toward the defense of recantation, a hostility that rejects the
relatively novel principle of mitigation for the time-honored principle of
deterrence.
The recantation must also occur before "it has become manifest
that such falsity has been or will be exposed."' 8 7 Decisions interpret this
language to mean that it is too late to recant if it has become manifest to
the witness that the falsity has been or will be exposed to the tribunal or
the government.88
This rule leads to disqualification in many cases in which the incen-
tive to recant arose from the witness's fear of exposure. The reason for
this rule is unclear. Rejection of recantation in such cases might be
based on one of three notions: (1) the information contained in the re-
cantation is of no value to the tribunal; (2) the witness who recants only
when facing exposure does not deserve a defense; or (3) to permit such
recantations will encourage perjury because the witness will always have
an "out" if the perjury is exposed.
The first justification is questionable. Even where the tribunal has
84. Id. at 614. This decision seems to hold that the required substantial affect can be
found not only in actions of the tribunal, but also in actions of a litigant, i.e. the prosecu-
tor. No warrant for this conclusion was given.
85. 366 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1973).
86. Id. at 1256. See also United States v. Crandall, 363 F. Supp. 648, 654-55 (W.D. Pa.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974) (delay of two months in recanting substantially
affected grand jury proceeding by depriving it of evidence for that period of time, even
though the grand jury was aware of the falsehood before the recantation).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1982).
88. United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 1981); United Staes v.
Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); United States v.
Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
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heard another witness directly contradict the defendant's prior testi-
mony, the tribunal may be uncertain about which account was accurate.
The defendant's recantation would often permit the tribunal to achieve
a more certain resolution of the contradiction. Such useful recantations
are discouraged by the statutory restriction, to no apparent purpose.
Rejecting such recantations for moral reasons also seems to frus-
trate the statutory policy of enhancing testimonial reliability.8 9 There is
little to choose between the morality of a witness who tells the truth
initially because of fear of exposure and the morality of a witness who
recants later because of a fear of exposure.
The third possible justification has received the most support inju-
dicial opinions.9 0 Courts fear that if the exposure requirement were
abandoned, perjurers will lie with impunity, secure in the knowledge
that if the lie is exposed, they can admit it and avoid prosecution. This
fear seems exaggerated, as discussed in Part IV, below. 9 1
In addition to the constraints placed upon recantation by Congress,
the courts too have displayed a reluctance to adopt the policy justifica-
tions of the recantation provision when construing the statute in areas in
which it is silent.9 2 For example, they have held that the government
has no duty to warn a witness that he may recant false statements, and
that it has no duty to give a witness who it believes to have testified
falsely an opportunity to recant.
93
Courts have also manifested a distrust of the behavioral effects of
the incentives the recantation provision is thought to offer to witnesses.
89. Speaking of a similar requirement contained in New York law, one judge said:
"[S]ince the recantation rule's purpose is not to reward or punish the liar but to get the
truth into the record, the perjurer's motive for recanting has nothing to do with it at all."
People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d at 444-45, 141 N.E.2d at 583-84, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (dissent-
ing opinion). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) and accompanying Comment (denying
a withdrawal defense to the crime of attempt where the withdrawal resulted from
probability of detection or other factors that made accomplishment of the criminal pur-
pose more difficult).
90. See infra, text accompanying notes 95-97.
91. The situations that give rise to disqualification because of exposure should be
noted. Courts have held that recantation comes too late if it comes after the prosecutor
warns the defendant that he may be charged with perjury. Thus, a prosecutor may appar-
ently cut off any possibility of recantation by confronting a suspected perjurer with his
falsehood immediately after his testimony. See United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d at 324.
Exposure becomes manifest in other situations in which it would seem inappropriate
to deny the recantation defense. For example, if the witness first makes an inconsistent
statement, and then, when it is drawn to his attention, more explicitly recants his original
declaration, the recantation might be deemed to be too late because exposure of falsity
became manifest to the witness by reason of his inconsistent statement. Another possibil-
ity of a disqualifying "manifestation" is the disclosure to a witness by his counsel that the
untruth will be revealed to the tribunal if the witness does not do so himself. See discus-
sion below at Part III.
92. Id. See Denison, 663 F.2d at 617 ("Section 1623(d) balances the need to encourage
a witness to correct his testimony against the need to prevent his perjury at the outset. We
see no reason to disturb this balance by broadening the immunity accorded to a witness
who recants ...."). See also United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d at 324 (making a similar
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In United States v. Moore,9 4 the court construed the relationship between
the two prerequisites to recantation, lack of effect on the tribunal and
lack of exposure of the falsehood. The statute requires that the recanta-
tion must occur "before the false declaration has had a substantial effect
on the proceeding, or before the exposure of the falsity of the declara-
tion has become manifest."'9 5 Although the New York statute upon
which the False Declaration Statute was modeled9 6 expresses the pre-
requisites in the conjunctive, using the word "and," the False Declara-
tion Statute expresses them in the disjunctive, using the word "or." In
Moore, the defendant argued that his recantation was timely because,
although disclosure of the falsehood had become manifest to him, the
falsehood had not yet affected the proceeding.
The court refused to read the False Declaration Statute disjunc-
tively, reasoning that to do so would frustrate Congressional intent.
The court acknowledged the inconsistency between the deterrent and
mitigation elements of the statute,9 7 but reasoned that construing the
recantation prerequisites in the disjunctive would weaken the deterrent
effect of the statute and would disrupt the intended balance between
these elements. This argument neatly begged the question by assuming
what it set out to prove, i.e. exactly where Congress intended to place
the balance point between deterrence and mitigation.
The court then speculated on the behavior that different construc-
tions of the statute would induce in witnesses, reiterating a fear origi-
nally articulated in United States v. Norris98 that the easy availability of a
recantation defense would make perjury more attractive. The hypotheti-
cal witness would believe that perjury was risk free: if the lie was not
discovered, he would not be prosecuted while if the lie was discovered,
he could recant and would not be prosecuted. This reasoning led the
Norris court to reject the retraction defense under the General Perjury
Statute. The Moore court 99 likewise reasoned that the False Declaration
Statute's deterrent effect would be nullified by giving perjurers the stat-
utory right to recant after their lies were disclosed, but before the pro-
ceeding was substantially affected.
The court was here engaged in open warfare against the policy of
the recantation provision. Citing Norris to explicate the recantation pro-
vision ignores the simple fact that the recantation provision was in-
tended to change the law that Norris expounded. The Moore decision is
more nearly an argument against the concept of a recantation defense
than an attempt to construe it: the court simply rejects the statutory
premise that recantation may induce more accurate testimony than inac-
94. 613 F.2d 1029 (1979).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
96. See infra text accompanying note 44.
97. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d at 1041.
98. 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).
99. Moore, 613 F.2d at 1041. This argument appears in Scrinmgeour, 636 F.2d 1019 (5th
Cir. 1981) and Denison, 663 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1981).
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curate testimony.' 0 0 The decision is, however, understandable because
of the ambivalence toward recantation displayed in the statute itself.
In summary, the federal perjury statutes treat inconsistent testi-
mony inconsistently, at times seizing on testimonial inconsistency as evi-
dence of perjury and at others seeming to urge inconsistency that
recognizes former testimony as false. What one might euphemistically
describe as the resulting "tension" between the deterrence and mitiga-
tion policies of the statutes is, for federal witnesses and their counsel, an
insoluble double bind.
III. CONFLICTING INCENTIVES CREATED BY THE FALSE
DISTINCTIONS OF THE STATUTE
The probable effect of criminal and other instrumentalist statutes is
usually analyzed by predicting the behavioral responses they are likely to
engender, using assumptions about rationality and self-interest not un-
like those used in economic analysis.' 0 ' Thus, for example, the deci-
sions in Moore and Norris rely on a typical, instrumentalist thought
experiment: How would a rational, self-interested witness who was
aware of the statute and its judicial construction take it into account in
deciding whether or not to commit perjury? One should be exception-
ally wary of such exercises when applied to perjury, for which no reliable
data exist to test the accuracy of the assumptions or the conclusions. In
default of empiricism, however, rhetoric remains the only instrument for
critique of criminal laws.
This section will use this approach to analyze the incentives and dis-
incentives relating to inconsistent testimony created by the federal per-
jury statutes for federal witnesses and federal trial attorneys. It will also
analyze the strategic benefits that the inconsistent statement provision
gives to federal prosecutors. It will attempt both to predict the actions
that the statutory sanctions will lead to and to weigh the desirability of
those actions against the goals of the statute.
A. Effects of the Perjury Statutes on Federal Witnesses
The inconsistent statement and recantation provisions will have ef-
fects on three categories of witness: those who contemplate committing
perjury for the first time in a proceeding; those who have committed
100. The Moore court's reading means that the defendant's attempts to prove the two
prerequisities to the recantation defense would often tend to be mutually exclusive. A lie
that has not been exposed is more likely to have substantially affected the proceeding.
Conversely, one major reason that a lie may not have substantially affected the proceeding
is that it has become manifest. In most cases, therefore, one of the two prerequisites
would probably fail, making the defense unavailable.
101. See Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalist in Twentieth CenturN American Thought-A Syn-
thesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
861 (1981); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1; Ehrlich, The Deterrent
Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, IJ. LEGAL STUD. 259, 261 (June 1972) (seeking to quan-
tify deterrence).
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perjury and contemplate correcting it; and those who have made unin-
tentionally false statements and contemplate correcting them.
Even if the witness is one whose behavior would be influenced by a
perjury statute, 10 2 the inconsistent statement provision would have no
deterrent effect on the decision to commit perjury in giving an initial
testimonial account. It would, however, provide a strong disincentive
to any witness whose original testimony was true and who is thinking of
testifying falsely by contradicting that testimony. Even in the absence of
the inconsistent statement provision, however, such a witness could be
prosecuted under the False Declaration Statute for making the second
statement. In such a prosecution, the original statement might be suffi-
cient evidence of guilt. In addition, as discussed below in this subsec-
tion, by employing a number of well-known strategies, such witnesses
can usually avoid repeating the original testimony in a different
proceeding.
It is possible that a recantation provision could affect the initial de-
cision to commit perjury, on the theory that recantation would be avail-
able if the lie failed. However, as seen above, such exposure disqualifies
an attempted recantation, which makes the recantation provision of little
importance to a witness contemplating perjury in giving an initial testi-
monial account of a matter.
For witnesses who have already testified inaccurately, the federal
perjury statutes inhibit any change in testimony, regardless of the truth-
fulness of the change or its value to the tribunal. A summary of the
provisions analyzed in the preceding section shows that a rational wit-
ness has no statutory incentive to correct prior testimony whether or not
the prior testimony was intentionally false.
First consider the witness whose original testimony was innocently
mistaken. Under the General Perjury Statute, although inconsistent tes-
timony alone will not suffice for conviction, an attempt to correct earlier
testimony may corroborate other evidence of the falsity of the earlier
testimony and permit a prosecution that would have been otherwise un-
maintainable. Because the Norris rule denies the witness the defense of
recantation, a witness who corrects prior testimony faces Norris's fate.
For the same witness, under the False Declaration Statute, correc-
tion of prior testimony constitutes an inconsistent statement unless it is
timely and in the correct form for a recantation. If it is held to be an
102. It is probable that a great deal of testimony is not actually affected by statutory
sanctions. Several categories of potential perjurers will presumably commit perjury under
any statutory regime. First, criminal defendants who perceive the benefit products risks of
perjury to exceed its cost products will not be deterred. To the witness/defendant
charged with a capital crime, if the the perjury is successful, it is rewarded, whereas if it
fails, the incremental punishment is insignificant. Likewise, witnesses who are induced by
intimidation to commit perjury will not be deterred if the threat of criminal sanctions is
less certain or severe than the intimidator's threat. Witnesses who are confident that their
lies will not be exposed, or that conclusive proof that they lied cannot be obtained, will not
perceive the risk of conviction for perjury to be significant. Finally, of course, witnesses
who do not reflect before committing perjury will not be affected by the statutory scheme
in making the initial decision to lie.
[Vol. 66:2
TESTIMONIAL CONSISTENCY
inconsistent statement, the correction establishes a prima facie case of
false declaration against the witness. The False Declaration Statute
gives the innocently incorrect witness nothing to gain and everything to
lose by correcting former testimony. Indeed, to the extent that the stat-
ute gives the innocent witness an incentive to testify in any particular
way, it encourages the witness to testify consistently with former testi-
mony even when that testimony was false.'
0 3
The hoped-for counter-effect of the False Declaration Statute's re-
cantation provision has been frustrated by statutory limitations and se-
vere judicial construction. The provision is as useless to witnesses
whose original testimony was innocently mistaken as it is to those whose
original testimony was intentionally false. A witness who truthfully
states that his former testimony was innocently mistaken will not be held
to have recanted.' 0 4 The statute offers no opportunity for such a wit-
ness to correct the record without risk of prosecution.
As for the witness whose original testimony was perjurious, the re-
cantation provision is of uncertain application because of the timeliness
requirements. An attempt to recant that fails because of one of these
requirements will destroy the witness's ability to defend against a charge
of false declaration because the attempted recantation provides compel-
ling evidence of both the falsity of prior testimony and the defendant's
knowledge of the truth.10 5
But even a timely recantation is no bargain to the perjurer.
Although recantation is a defense to a charge of false declaration, a wit-
ness remains susceptible to prosecution under the General Perjury Stat-
ute for making the recanted statement. No reported decision, 0 6 has yet
ruled on a defense that prosecution was barred under the General Per-
jury Statute by reason of a recantation under the False Declaration Stat-
ute, but language in several decisions suggests that such a prosecution is
possible.' 0 7 Thus, a witness may be prosecuted under the General Per-
103. Although the federal statutes do not address the issue, decisions construing the
General Perjury Statute have held that repetitions of a perjurious statement do not subject
a witness to multiple counts of perjury. Thus, the risk of perjury is not increased apprecia-
bly by a witness's repetition of a prior incorrect statement while correction of it holds far
more peril.
104. See discussion above at Part II-C-2.
105. Once rejected, the recantation issue may not be raised at trial and argued to
the jury. The rule of [United States v. Norris] that recantation is no defense to
perjury still holds sway when a defendant does not come within the recantation
provisions of section 1623(d) and creates a bar to prosecution.
United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d at 618.
106. In United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283 (2d Cir. 1973), the court failed to
reach this issue because it found the defendant, convicted under the General Perjury Stat-
ute, had failed to recant before the falsehood was exposed. However, it expressed discom-
fort with the idea that the government could prosecute under the General Perjury Statute
if recantation successfully barred prosecution under the False Declaration Statute.
107. Denison, 663 F.2d at 616 n.6 (the recantation defense is available only to defend-
ants charged under section 1623, not to those charged under section 1621.); United States
v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931 (dictum). In
United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1974), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977),
defendants argued that the recantation provision was unconstitutional on grounds, among
others, that the government could prosecute a recanting witness for perjury under 18
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jury Statute for making a statement that he recanted.10 8 It is likely that
a recantation would corroborate falsity, in partial satisfaction of the two-
witness rule, because of the rule that a recantation must unambiguously
admit the falsity of the original statement and cannot attribute that inac-
curacy to innocent error. 10 9 Thus, the perjured witness who is genu-
inely afraid of prosecution has absolutely no rational motive to recant.
The disincentives created by the federal perjury law's treatment of
inconsistent testimony pose a threat to the process of cross-examina-
tion. The adversary trial examination, not prosecution for perjury, is
the judicial system's chief institutional mechanism for assuring accurate
testimony.110 The adversary system relies primarily on the skill of the
trial attorney in marshalling evidence and cross-examining witnesses in
order to expose and neutralize inaccurate testimony, of both the inten-
tional and unintentional variety.iII
The inconsistent statement provision impedes the cross-examiner's
ability to expose inaccurate testimony. Once a federal witness has given
testimony, the federal statutes' command is not to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. It is rather to tell the same
thing, and nothing but the same thing, that the witness told before.1
1 2
Cross-examination can grind to a halt when the risks associated with
changes in testimony brook so large as to lead witnesses to assert their
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination."l
3
U.S.C. § 1621. The court rejected this argument, holding that Congress could, consistent
with due process, condition access to the protection of the recantation provision by requir-
ing the defendant to increase his exposure to prosecution under the General Perjury
Statute.
108. See supra note 107. The curious interplay between the General Perjury Statute and
the recantation provision illustrates the effect of borrowing a statutory provision out of
context. Both the New York Penal Code, the form on which the False Declaration Statute
was modeled, and the Model Penal Code contain a recantation defense. In each case,
recantation exonerates the witness from all criminal liability for the perjury. The False
Declaration Statute, however, merely supplements the General Perjury Statute. The re-
cantation defense thus has radically different implications in the federal scheme of law.
Recantation under the False Declaration Statute exposes the witness to greater liability
than exists under the General Perjury Statute.
109. Under the General Perjury Statute, admission that prior testimony was false can
provide essential ammunition for the prosecution. The recantation may corroborate an-
other witness's testimony as to falsity, thereby satisfying the two-witness rule. The recan-
tation can also establish that the witness knew the truth at the time of the first statement,
tending to prove that the original statement was intentionally false. Thus, the General
Perjury Statute offers the strongest disincentives to correct inaccurate testimony.
110. See Best, supra note 13 (quote).
111. Wigmore celebrated cross-examination as:
[T]he greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth .... If we
omit political considerations of broader range, then cross-examination, not trial
by jury, is the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of
law to improved methods of trial procedure.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 1367.
112. Because of the "freezing effect," witnesses have been shown to become stub-
bornly committed to the first version of facts that they recount, even in the face of signifi-
cant evidence to the contrary. E. LoFrus & J. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 84-87
(1979). Thus, there is a bias against correcting previous testimonial accounts. Cf State v.
Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939). This bias is aggravated by threaten-
ing a witness who thinks of revising his testimony.
113. Witnesses often assert the fifth amendment privilege to avoid cross-examination
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It is reasonable to assume that innocent error is considerably more
common than perjury. The effect of discouraging correction in cases of
innocent error would seem to exceed the marginal harm of any perjury
inhibited by the inconsistent statement and recantation provisions as
presently formulated. In addition, one must charge the inconsistent
statement provision with the costs of perjury committed by witnesses
who falsely affirm prior inaccurate testimony. For such witnesses, dis-
honest reaffirmation of the error keeps the testimony consistent and may
be the less risky alternative.
B. Effects on the Legal Profession
The risks created by the federal perjury statutes create quandaries
for lawyers advising federal witnesses. Both the American Bar Associa-
tion Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (ABA Rules)" 4 and the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA
Code)" i 5 require that an attorney who learns that false evidence has
been presented to a tribunal must try to persuade the witness to correct
the error and, failing that, must advise the court of the falsehood if the
attorney can do so without revealing privileged matter. 1 6 Disclosure
in criminal trials. See United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1292 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976) (striking the direct testimony of a government witness who
invoked the fifth amendment when cross-examined by defendant's counsel). Accord,
United States v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 1981).
114. Candor Toward the Tribunal. (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . . (2) fail to
disclose a material fact to a tribunal when the disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; . . . (4) offer evidence that the
lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures. (b) The
duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and
apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected
by rule 1.6. [pertaining to client confidences].
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3 (1983). Comment 5 discusses the lawyer's
duties when false evidence has been offered:
When false evidence is offered by the client, however, a conflict may arise be-
tween the lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations confidential and the duty
of candor to the court. Upon ascertaining that material evidence is false, the law-
yer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered or,
if it has been offered, that its false character should immediately be disclosed. If
that persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures.
See also Comments 4, 6, 11 and 12.
115. Representing a Client within the Bounds of the Law: (A) In his representation of a
client, a lawyer shall not: ... (4) Knowingly use perjured or false evidence ... (7)
Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraud-
ulent .... (B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (I)
His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if
his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged com-
munication. (2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a
tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-102(A)(4), 7-102(B)(1) & (2)
(1981).
116. The Model Rules require the attorney to take "reasonable remedial measures" if
the persuasion is not effective:
If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the advocate's proper
course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the client confidentially. If that fails, the
advocate should seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situation. If withdrawal
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may result in the witness, perhaps the attorney's client, being prose-
cuted for perjury or false declaration.
117
In the context of federal perjury statutes, the warning requirement
creates a particularly acute dilemma for the witness's counsel. The
warning makes the imminent exposure of the falsehood to the tribunal
manifest to the witness. This exposure arguably renders the witness's
recantation, if he chooses to give it, ineffective."l
8
The ABA Rules and the ABA Code harmonize poorly with the fed-
eral perjury statutes. A witness who changes his testimony incurs seri-
ous risks, yet, attorneys are instructed to urge witnesses to take precisely
those risks. The attorney who urges a witness to correct a falsehood
does so because of his professional responsibility as an officer of the
court, not out of concern for the interests of the witness.1 1 9 The wit-
ness, who may have committed a crime, is urged to waive his constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination and give what amounts to an
in-court, sworn confession. It is disquieting to contemplate a court-
will not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate should make disclo-
sure to the court. It is for the court then to determine what should be done-
making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or
perhaps nothing. If the false testimony was that of the client, the client may con-
trovert the lawyer's version of their communication when the lawyer discloses the
situation to the court. If there is an issue whether the client has committed per-
jury, the lawyer cannot represent the client in resolution of the issue and a mis-
trial may be unavoidable. An unscrupulous client might in this way attempt to
produce a series of mistrials and thus escape prosecution. However, a second
such encounter could be construed as a deliberate abuse of the right to counsel
and as such a waiver of the right to further representation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3, Comment 11 (1983).
117. Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the rule generally recognized is
that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the existence
of the client's deception to the court or to the other party. Such a disclosure can
result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal
but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alterna-
tive is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the
truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement ....
Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty
to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's
advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the
client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DE-
VELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 125 (1987). Cf. Why Did Lee Testify in the
W1"ang Case, The Wall Street Journal, July 8, 1988 at 17, col.3 (recounting the story of an
attorney who advised his client to recant, risking prosecution for the crimes about which
the client had testified, in order to avoid perjury charges).
118. If an attorney's advice tainted the recantation, the statute would conflict with the
policies of the rules regarding professional conduct. The warning given to the client
would strip the client of a possible opportunity to avoid criminal liability. Yet, no obvious
policy relevant to the False Decalaration Statute would distinguish an attorney's threat of
disclosure from a threat made by others, such as the prosecutor or a third party. The
statutory policy seems to emphasize the morality of the witness's decision to recant, per-
mitting the defense if the recantation is stimulated by a guilty conscience but denying a
defense if the recantation results from fear of exposure. Courts have emphasized this dis-
tinction in applying the statute. See e.g. United States v. D'Auria, 672 F.2d 1085 (1981).
119. The witness's interests would require that he be advised to seek independent




enforced rule of professional conduct that requires an attorney to advise
a person to waive a fundamental constitutional right.
These conflicts are not inevitable, but flow in large part from the
statutory scheme now in place, a scheme that jeopardizes any witness
who risks rectification of testimonial errors. A rule that would remove
the risk of recantation would reduce the occasions for such troublesome
professional dilemmas. '
20
C. Effects on the Prosecution of Organized Crime
One might seek to justify the behavioral effects just described by
arguing that the inconsistent statement provision has great utility to the
government in criminal prosecutions. When Congress enacted the Fed-
eral False Declaration Statute'21 as part of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,122 it heralded the statute as part of a new arsenal of weap-
ons in the war against organized crime. 123 Witnesses are difficult to
prosecute for perjury under the General Perjury Statute. 124 Elimination
of the common law evidentiary restraints, including the inconsistent
statement rule, was intended to make it easier for the government to
obtain convictions for perjury, consequently deterring perjury and in-
creasing convictions for the substantive offenses.
12 5
But does the inconsistent statement provision really alter the bal-
ance of power between the prosecution and the criminal defendant? In
light of the abandonment of the two-witness rule, the inconsistent state-
ment provision would seem to be of value only in the relatively rare
circumstance in which the government cannot decide which of a wit-
ness's contradictory statements to charge as false. The provision has,
however, the potential for considerably more utility because it can be
called into play when the government is unwilling, rather than unable,
to designate the false statement. Consider the following scenario:
120. These dilemmas are difficult enough if, as is implicit in the discussion, it is as-
sumed that the lawyer "knows" that the witness testified falsely. As Justice Stevens noted:
A lawyer's certainty that a change in his client's recollection is a harbinger of intended
perjury . . . should be tempered by the realization that, after reflection, the most honest
witness may recall (or sincerely believe he recalls) details that he previously overlooked.
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
121. Pub. L. No. 94-550, 90 Stat. 2535 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1623
(1982)).
122. The False Declaration Statute was enacted as Title IV of the 1970 Organized
Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 932 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982))
and was amended in Pub. L. No. 94-550, 90 Stat. 2535.
123. "[W]e are going to try to make S.30 [The Organized Crime Control Act] the vehi-
cle for the legislation that is directed primarily at organized crime and providing additional
weapons with which to combat organized crime." See Hearings, supra note 29, at 107 (re-
marks of Sen. McClellan). "The purpose of the [Organized Crime Control Act] is to cor-
rect certain defects in our evidence gathering process."
124. See Heaings, supra note 29.
125. By facilitating perjury prosecutions, the False Declaration Statute was intended to
enhance the reliability of testimony before the federal courts and grand juries and afford
greater assurance that "testimony obtained in grand jury and court proceedings will aid
the cause of truth." S. REP. No. 617, 59 (1969). See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100,
107-08 (1979).
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Government calls Witness, who testifies at a grand jury proceeding.
In response to the prosecutor's questions and in the absence of objec-
tions or cross-examination, Witness implicates Defendant in criminal ac-
tivity.126 At the trial of Defendant, however, Witness changes or recants
his grand jury testimony. As a result, Defendant is acquitted. Govern-
ment charges Witness with perjury.
Under the General Perjury Statute, Government must choose which
of Witness's statements to charge as perjurious. This is sometimes a
painful choice: If Government charges that the grand jury testimony
was perjurious, Government would be contradicting the position it took
at Defendant's trial, which would be institutionally embarrassing. If it
charges that the trial testimony was perjurious, it faces proving the truth
of Witness's grand jury testimony, something that it has just failed to
prove in Defendant's trial. The problem under the General Perjury
Statute is not so much that the Government does not know which ver-
sion of Witness's story to challenge; it is rather that any specific chal-
lenge would be difficult to maintain.
The inconsistent statement provision of the False Declaration Stat-
ute resolves this dilemma. The statute does not require that, in order to
prosecute under subsection (c), the government be ignorant of the
truth, or have no corroborating evidence. The government can simply
charge and prove that the witness made inconsistent statements, then sit
back and watch him try to explain the discrepancy. With the sublime
indifference of a logician exposing a contradiction, the prosecutor need
take no embarrassing positions as to which of the witness's statements
was really true.
By simplifying the prosecution of grand jury witnesses who change
their testimony at subsequent trials, Congress hoped to strengthen the
government's ability to hold wavering grand jury witnesses in line at the
trials of grand jury target defendants. 12 7 The provision nails such wit-
nesses to their grand jury testimony, testimony that was taken in the
absence of confrontation and without objections or contemporaneous
cross-examination by the defendant, testimony that might have been
quite different if taken under the adversarial conditions of trial. The
government can meet any substantive change in the witness's story with
a charge of false declaration under the inconsistent statement provision.
This threat diminishes the utility of the defendant's constitutional 128
right of cross-examination by preventing his counsel from obtaining
concessions of error during the cross-examination of such witnesses at
the defendant's trial.
Congress had these strategic effects of the statute in mind when it
enacted the statute. Part of the statutory purpose was to prevent grand
126. It is assumed that the prosecution does not have reason to believe that the wit-
ness's grand jury testimony is perjurious. A conviction obtained by the government's
knowing use of perjured testimony violates the fifth amendment due process clause. Gig-
lio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
127. See Hearings, supra note 31.
128. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
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jury witnesses from changing their testimony in response to underworld
pressure.' 29 Yet any statutory threat of sufficient magnitude to offset
underworld threats of personal violence would seriously inhibit a wit-
ness who desired to change his grand jury testimony for less compelling
reasons, e.g. that it was simply mistaken. And in civil litigation, where
underworld threats are a rarity, the potent threat of the inconsistent
statement provision is even more dis.tortive.
Ironically, caselaw suggests that witnesses in criminal cases who
want to change their grand jury testimony may be able to nullify the
effect of the provision anyway. A well-advised grand jury witness who,
because of intimidation or less venal motives, desires to testify differ-
ently at the defendant's trial has many alternatives. If he wishes to say
nothing at the defendant's trial, he can simply invoke the fifth amend-
ment when questioned at that trial. His basis for invoking the privilege
would be his fear of a prosecution for perjury before the grand jury.13
0
If the witness thus refuses to testify, the government cannot introduce
the witness's grand jury testimony, which is hearsay.' 3 1 Nor can it com-
pel the witness to testify over his objection without granting him use
immunity. 13
2
After being granted use immunity at the trial, the witness can dis-
claim his grand jury testimony without running afoul of the inconsistent
statement provision.' 3 3 The government cannot use immunized trial
testimony in prosecuting the witness for perjury at the grand jury,'
3 4
129. See Hearings, supra note 31.
130. Although a witness may not claim the fifth amendment for fear that what he is
about to say may be perjurious, United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903; United States v. Wilcox, 450 F.2d 1131, 1141 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 917 (1972) (dictum), he may invoke the privilege if he fears that the testi-
mony he will give would subject him to liability for perjury in an earlier proceeding. Wil-
cox, 450 F.2d at 1141; Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911). The prior
testimony does not waive the fifth amendment for this purpose. Wilcox, 450 F.2d at 1141.
If the witness intends to testify inconsistently with prior testimony, the privilege would
therefore be appropriate.
131. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) (limiting use of prior statements to those made by a
declarant who testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concern-
ing the statement).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1986).
133. The Federal Immunity Statute provides in part that if a witness is compelled to
testify over his claim of a fifth amendment privilege, "no testimony or other information
compelled under the order [compelling such testimony] (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the wit-
ness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order." 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982) (emphasis added). False testimony
of an immunized witness may be admitted in a prosecution for perjury in giving the testi-
mony introduced as evidence of the corpus delecti. United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174
(1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 584-85 (1976). An immunized wit-
ness's truthful testimony can be introduced in a perjury prosecution for false testimony
given under the same grant of immunity and before the same tribunal. United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980) ("[Immunized] testimony remains inadmissible in all
prosecutions for offenses committed prior to the grant of immunity that would have per-
mitted the witness to invoke his fifth amendment privilege absent the grant.") A witness,
however, may not assert the fifth amendment privilege to avoid giving testimony that will
be perjurious when given.
134. United States v. Doe, 819 F.2d 11 (lst Cir. 1987) (immunized grand jury testi-
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nor can it charge the witness under the inconsistent statement provi-
sion.I3 5 The government must either charge that the trial testimony was
a false declaration (and in the witness's trial for this charge, the govern-
ment can use his grand jury testimony whether immunized or not)' 3 6 or
it can charge that the grand jury testimony was a false declaration and
attempt to prove its case by other evidence. But in neither case is the
inconsistent statement provision of any use.
A second strategy the reluctant witness can use is to affirm the
grand jury testimony on direct examination, then to refuse to testify on
cross-examination by defendant's counsel, claiming the privilege of the
fifth amendment. If, as a result of the claim of privilege, the defendant is
not permitted to cross-examine as to the substance of the testimony
given on direct examination, the defendant is entitled to have the testi-
mony stricken.13 7 The witness, unless granted immunity, need not con-
tradict his grand jury testimony using this technique. Nevertheless, the
government loses the use of it.
Even if the witness does not invoke the fifth amendment or insist on
immunity, the inconsistent statement provision does not prevent the ef-
fective disavowal of prior testimony through a claim of uncertainty or a
loss of memory. The provision refers to statements that are so "incon-
sistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false.' 3 8 A witness
who professes to a failure of memory between the grand jury proceeding
and the trial has not satisfied this standard; memories can fail. 139 Faced
with such a loss of memory, however, the government can introduce the
witness's grand jury testimony at the defendant's trial. 140 And this tech-
nique is riskier for the witness, who can be prosecuted for perjury in
mony cannot be used as evidence to prove charge of perjury in prior appearance); United
States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 988 n.5 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct 259; United
States v. Seltzer, 621 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1986).
135. In re Grand Jury Porceedings, 644 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pat-
rick, 542 F.2d 381, 384-86 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977); United States
v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf United States v. Dunn, 442 U.S. 100
(1979) (approving prosecution under subsection (c) where the second inconsistent state-
ment admitted the falsity of the immunized grand jury testimony).
136. United States v. Seltzer, 794 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pisani,
590 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
137. See supra, note 11. Cf United States v. Pelusion, 725 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 1983)
(it is not necessary to strike the direct testimony of a government witness who invokes the
fifth amendment on cross-examination on a collateral matter not related to his direct
testimony).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982).
139. United States v. Flowers, 813 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1987) (reversing conviction
under section 1623(c) where, although witness testified to different account in second pro-
ceeding, upon cross-examination he readily admitted that the differences in his testimony
were due to a faulty memory and that his memory was better in the prior proceeding).
140. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, the government can introduce the text of
the grand jury testimony of a witness who professes loss of recollection because the wit-
ness is deemed to be available for defendant to cross-examine. California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970); United States v. Russell, 712 F.2d 1256, 1258 (8th Cir. 1983). See United
States ex rel. Thomas v. Cuyler, 548 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1977) (distinguishing a witness
who does not recall grand jury testimony at trial from one who pleads the fifth amendment
- the latter's testimony may not be introduced).
[Vol. 66:2
TESTIMONIAL CONSISTENCY
denying memory. Again, however, the inconsistent statement provision
provides no way of forcing the immunized witness to testify truthfully.
Viewed strictly as a weapon in the war on organized crime, the in-
consistent statement provision would appear to offer the government
minimal strategic gain to offset its potential for harm to other trial
testimony.
These observations must, however, be qualified because of the way
in which the current statutes are enforced. The behavioral effect of stat-
utes is modified drastically by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Statutes that are enforced according to unstated standards of
prosecutorial discretion no longer mean what they say, or even what
courts say they say. Today's federal prosecutors do not seek indictments
under the present statute against witnesses in civil cases who, on cross-
examination, decide, well, yes maybe it was raining on the day of the
accident after all.
An impressionistic survey of the reported cases suggests that the
inconsistent statement provision is applied mainly to professional
criminals. Strict enforcement of the inconsistent statement provision
across the board would be too likely to ruin a good weapon in the war
on organized crime. The indeterminacy introduced by the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion thus makes both critique and justification of the
rule difficult.
Nevertheless, written law should conform to law in practice as much
as possible, if only to give the citizen and her attorney some idea of the
risks that actually attend their options. To hide the illogic of the False
Declaration Statute behind the benevolent judgment of the federal pros-
ecutors weakens the rule of law. If the False Declaration Statute is to
have a narrow scope, it should be amended to reflect that scope.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE FALSE DECLARATION STATUTE
The twin problems of overbreadth-the tendency of the statute to
reach innocent testimonial inconsistencies-and counterproductivity-
the inhibition of desirable correction of both perjurious and non-per-
jurious testimony-both arise because the federal perjury statutes em-
phasize deterring initial perjury at the expense of encouraging
mitigation of the effects of perjury through recantation. The root con-
flict between the deterrence and mitigation policies of the statutes has
created an incoherent approach to testimonial inconsistency.
At a minimal cost in deterrence, the problems of overbreadth and
counterproductivity could be ameliorated by a more uniform policy lib-
erally permitting testimonial corrections. Statutory amendments that
might accomplish this are described below:
1. Make the inconsistent statement provision of the False Declara-
tion Statute inapplicable to statements made in the same proceeding.
Given the abolition of the two witness rule, which simplified the
proof of false declaration, the additional or marginal value of the incon-
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sistent statement provision is slight in comparison to its cost. It will usu-
ally be unnecessary to secure convictions because, unlike prosecutions
under the General Perjury Statute, prosecutions under the False Decla-
ration Statute can proceed on the basis of the witness's contradictory
statement alone.
The inconsistent statement provision has little value when applied
to inconsistencies in the same proceeding, given the countervailing
value expressed in the recantation provision. The purely formal differ-
ences between inconsistent statements and recantations do not justify
inhibiting or punishing testimonial corrections that are made without
the necessary shibboleths.
2. Amend the Recantation Provision by (1) deleting both the
"substantial effect" and "disclosure" requirements; (2) permitting a
witness to designate as a recantation any statement that directly contra-
dicted a former statement for which the defendant is charged for false
declaration or perjury; (3) making recantation a defense to any charge
under the General Perjury Statute; and (4) providing that recantation
would be untimely if it does not occur in the same proceeding as the
statement recanted or if it occurs after indictment for perjury in making
the statement recanted.
These changes express a liberalized rule permitting mitigation of
perjury before the end of the proceeding in which it was uttered. Under
the proposed amendments, the existence of a recantation will not turn
on the precise form of the testimony with which prior testimony is dis-
avowed. A witness could designate what were formerly inconsistent
statements within the same proceeding as a statement and its recanta-
tion, regardless of the form of the second of the two statements. As a
result, a witness would be bound only by the last version of his testi-
mony within a given proceeding. Most importantly, the amendment
would permit witnesses to revise innocent testimonial errors without
risking liability under the federal perjury laws.
The statute would offer the perjured witness a real incentive to re-
cant because recantation would eliminate the risk of prosecution. The
proposed amendments eliminate the uncertainty about whether the re-
cantation timing prerequisites were satisfied, since the recantation
would be timely if it occurred at any time before the proceeding ended
and before the witness was indicted. 14 1 The Catch-22 liability to a
charge under the General Perjury Statute would be eliminated.
This change would also reduce the conflict between an attorney's
duties to disclose falsehood to a tribunal and her duties to clients or
witnesses who may have testified untruthfully. Because a witness could
change his testimony within the same proceeding without penalty, an
attorney who believed that a witness had testified falsely could urge the
141. By permitting recantations until the end of the proceeding, the proposed amend-
ment to the federal statute would avoid the problem raised by the Model Penal Code of




* witness to rectify the error on the record without, in effect, advising the
witness to create the very evidence that could convict the witness of a
crime. Even if the attorney were required to disclose the falsity to the
tribunal, the witness would still have an opportunity to avoid liability by
subsequent recantation prior to an indictment because recantation
would no longer be barred by the disclosure of the falsehood to the
tribunal.
A. Evaluation of Proposed Changes
The proposed amendments can be criticized for two reasons: they
do not go far enough in eliminating the evils associated with perjury
law's bias toward consistency and they go too far in reducing the deter-
rent effect of the present scheme. The proposed changes admittedly do
not eliminate the evils associated with the elevation of consistency over
truth where testimony is given in more than one proceeding. A grand
jury witness can still be prosecuted for testifying differently at a subse-
quent trial. If a grand jury witness fails to recant a false declaration
before the term of the grand jury expires, he cannot correct the error at
a subsequent criminal trial and can be charged under the inconsistent
statement provision. This inability might well prevent a witness from
testifying truthfully at the trial or subsequent proceeding. However, the
prospective gain from recantation is greatly reduced after the tribunal
relies on the lie. In addition, permitting a witness to recant at any time
after the end of the proceeding in which he lied would permit risk-free
perjury. 
14 2
The proposed amendments do not prevent a witness who recants
from being prosecuted for lying during his recantation, 143 nor do they
prevent the government from using the first declaration in such a prose-
cution. In some cases, this risk could inhibit a desirable revision of erro-
neous testimony. Otherwise, however, the witness would be able to lie
with impunity during recantation.
Many have voiced the fear that an unlimited right of recantation
might encourage perjury by those who think it possible that their lies
will be exposed, if at all, during the proceeding. 14 4 Such witnesses
might be deterred under the original statute because exposure would
142. The interests at stake in the grand jury proceeding differ from those at stake in
other contexts because of the effect on the non-witness's (the prospective criminal defend-
ant's) right of confrontation. A possible solution, consistent with at least part of the con-
gressional intention, would be to make the inconsistent statement provision applicable
only to grand jury witnesses who had testified under a grant of immunity. This rule would
give the government considerable control over such witnesses. A grant of immunity gives
the criminal defendant against whom the witness testifies grounds for impeachment that
partially offset the governments prosecutorial power over the witness.
143. It should be noted that prosecutors and courts are generally mistrustful for the
witness who recants incriminating testimony. Frossard, When the Accuser Recants: People v.
Dotson, 14 A.B.A.J. SEc. LITIG., No. 4, 11, 12 (1988). Yet, while experience may teach that
such recantations are usually false, the inconsistent statement provision and the recanta-
tion provision do nothing to inhibit them in the same proceeding.
144. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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instantly make recantation impossible. They would perceive the risk of
prosecution as much smaller if they could recant after exposure of the
falsehood.
This fear seems to be exaggerated. For one thing, the perjury is
"risk free" only if the perjury is exposed during the proceeding and not
afterward, when the possibility of recantation has passed. The perjurer
who does not anticipate disclosure until after the proceeding is over will
not be affected by the proposed statutory change because it will not af-
fect his likelihood of being prosecuted. In addition, critics of liberalized
recantation tend to ignore the effect of uncertainty on the potential per-
jurer's calculations. The uncertainty is most pronounced for witnesses
contemplating perjury before a grand jury, where testimony is taken in
secret. At the time when the witness must decide whether or not to lie,
he must estimate the likelihood that he can learn of such secret testi-
mony and recant before he is indicted by the grand jury. This requires
estimating the combined chances that (1) his lie will be exposed, (2) the
prosecutor and grand jury will believe the exposing testimony and (3)
the witness will learn of the lie and be able to recant before an indict-
ment for perjury against him is handed down or the jury's term ends.
Perjury under such uncertainty of risk is not "risk free."
The uncertainty of risk is less for witnesses testifying at trial, but
such witnesses must still evaluate the likelihood that the conflicting evi-
dence will be believed and the likelihood that the witness can recant
before being indicted for perjury. The witness must be concerned not
with his credibility before tribunal in which the perjury is committed but
with his credibility before a grand jury and another tribunal concerned
with his perjury. The witness cannot know whether the perjury will ulti-
mately "succeed" until after the end of the original proceeding. Again,
such perjury is not "risk free."
Admittedly, and despite the uncertainty, it is likely that permitting
recantation after exposure may increase perjury by some amount. Even
so, it is plausible that the overall gain that the amendment would pro-
duce in accurate testimony would exceed the loss. The number of non-
perjurious witnesses who have occasion to change their testimony is far
greater than the number of potential perjurers whose decision to lie will
be affected by the liberalized recantation provision. Untruth can have
the same harmful effect on the judicial process whether it is innocent or
intended. The potential harm of the present statutory scheme appears
to outweigh its benefit by a large margin.
The proposed amendments would make the law of perjury more
congruent with civil litigation practice as well. In the federal civil law-
suit, to which the False Declaration Statute also applies, witnesses are
expressly permitted to change sworn testimony that they believe to be in
error. A strict avoidance of inconsistent testimony would harden initial
positions far more than is desirable.
The proposed amendments would rationalize the incentives offered
federal court witnesses at little cost in prosecutorial enforcement. While
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they would not solve all the problems associated with the attempt to
compel honest behavior by threats of punishment, they offer the maxi-
mum encouragement to such behavior consistent with the punitive, in-
strumentalist regime of criminal law.
CONCLUSION
In enacting the False Declaration Statute, Congress gave little atten-
tion to the effect of the statute on the average federal witness. Its
threats against inconsistent testimony are probably not what Congress
wanted such witnesses to bear in mind during cross-examination. It is
certainly doubtful that Congress intended to enact a rule that encour-
ages all well-counseled witnesses in federal court to take the fifth
amendment as soon as cross-examination begins. Whatever strategic
advantage that the prosecution gains from such a rule is largely offset by
common strategies that well-represented dishonest witnesses can
employ.
The federal perjury statutes should incorporate a more accurate
recognition of the realities of the trial experience. Consistency is not a
testimonial virtue when it comes at the expense of truth. Inconsistency
is often the mark of the honest mind grappling with the frailties of
human memory. The law of perjury should not threaten such candor
without better justification.
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